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LAWYERS AS AMERICA'S GOVERNING CLASS: THE
FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S ROLE

RUSSELL G. PEARCEt

INTRODUCTION

The self-image of American lawyers has undergone a major transformation.
As recently as the early 1960s, Erwin Smigel's renowned study of Wall Street
lawyers declared them to be guardians of the law.' While serving their clients'
interests, they maintained a higher commitment to the public good which permitted them to manage the relationship between law and power that was essen2
tial to the continued stability of, and rule of law in, a democratic society.
Twenty years later, a number of distinguished scholars reconsidered the role of
elite lawyers at a conference at Stanford Law School.3 They painted an entirely
different picture. Far from being guardians of the law, most corporate lawyers
were hired guns who provided their clients with little independent judgment or
4
counsel. Concern for the public good was not important to their work.
To explain this transformation, this article will examine how lawyers have
t Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University
School of Law. I presented an earlier version of this article to faculty workshops at the Bar lan, Haifa University, and Hebrew University Law Schools and appreciate the helpful comments of the participants in those
workshops. I would also like to thank Mary Daly, Matt Diller, Dave Douglas, Kristen Edwards, Jill Fisch, Jim
Fleming, Bob Gordon, Bruce Green, Geoff Hazard, Bob Kaczorowsld, John Leubsdorf, Tom Morgan, Deb-

orah Rhode, Tanina Rostain, Amy Uelmen, and Ian Weinstein for their valuable responses to an earlier draft.
1.

Erwin 0. Smigel, The Wall StreetLawyer: ProfesionalOrganizationMan? (Indiana 1964).

2.

Id.

3.
4.

Robert W. Gordon, Introduction to Smposium on the CorporateL.aw Firm,37 Stan L Rev 271 (1985).
See, for example, Robert A. Kagan and Robert Eli Rosen, On the Sodal Significance of Large Law

Firm Pracice, 37 Stan L Rev 399 (1985); Robert L Nelson, Ideology, Pratice,and ProfessionalAutonom7y: Sodal
Values and Client Relatonsbhos in the LargeLaw Firm, 37 Stan L Rev 503 (1985).
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historically understood their role5 and why that understanding has changed since
the 1960s. 6 In particular, the article will focus on the views of the legal elitethose influential members of the bar, bench and academy that have received the
most attention from contemporaries and historians. 7 Whether the conduct of
the legal elite has actually conformed to its own beliefs is beyond the scope of
8
this article.
5. This topic has received great attention in the legal literature. Commentators have variously described the original conception of the lawyer's role as that of (1) the advocate, see, for example, Monroe
Freedman, Understanding Lawyer's Ethics 65-66 (Matthew Bender 1990) (identifying the advocacy role as the
historical source of modern legal ethics); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in David Luban, ed, The
Good Lawyer 83, 84 (Rowman & Allanheld 1984) (same); (2) the gentleman, see Thomas L. Shaffer, American
Legal Ethics: Text, Readings, and Discussion Topics xxiv (Matthew Bender 1985); or (3) the guild member, see
Elliott A. Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present 1-28
(Yale 1996). Others have suggested the individual lawyer-statesman as the original ideal. See, for example,
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 12 (Belknap 1993); William H.
Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman inAmerican Histoy, 9 Harv J L & Public Pol 537 (1986). And others look to
Tocqueville's conception of lawyers as America's aristocracy. See Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under
Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming America Society (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1994).
This article argues that the historically dominant ideology of the legal elite was neither the hired gun,
gentlemen, guild, nor even the individual lawyer-statesman. The article identifies the dominant ideology as
a governing class perspective grounded not in Tocqueville but in the political understandings of American
lawyers. In doing so, it expands and elaborates upon my earlier work. See Russell G. Pearce, The Lawyer and
Public Service, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 171 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: PostProfessionalism, Moral Leadershp, and the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 Fla St U L Rev 9 (1999); Russell G.
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shft: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 NYU L Rev 1229 (1995); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics 241 (1992).
6. See Part III below.
7. The article employs the generally accepted definitions of the legal elite. In the early nineteenth
century, the elite included those lawyers and judges who through their work and ideas were acknowledged
to have shaped the development of the law, the courts, and the legal academy, as well as prominent practitioners who represented the well to do. See, for example, Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America 99-121
(Harcourt, Brace & World 1965) (describing those who played a key role in "the rise of a profession")
(capitalization omitted); George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics 75 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1993) (reprint of 5th ed 1884) (noting that lawyers who earned the greatest respect from their colleagues
represented business interests). From the late nineteenth century through the present day, the elite has
largely consisted of lawyers who represent big businesses, together with a small group of prominent academics and judges. See, for example, John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the American
Bar Association, in Gerard W. Gawalt, ed, The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America 75 (Greenwood Press 1984) (describing the elite founders of the American Bar Association); John P. Heinz and
Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (Northwestern rev ed 1994) (identifying
lawyers for corporations as having the most prestige and power in the legal profession); MichaelJ. Powell,
From Patrician to Professional Elite: The Transformation of the New York Ciy BarAssociation 227 n 4 (Russell Sage
Foundation 1988) (noting that "[pirofessors and deans, or former deans, of New York's leading law
schools ... are the only lawyers other than the large-firm elite to have gained access to the office [of President of the City Bar] in the postwar period"); Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainuy: Elite Lawyers in the
New Deal xi (Duke 1995) (describing the elite as "successful academics at elite institutions, influential policy
makers, and wealthy corporate lawyers'). Although lawyers in government are not generally part of the
elite, elite lawyers who engage in public service do not lose their elite status. See Smigel, The Wall Street
Lawyer at 8-10 (cited in note 1).
8. See, for example, Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem America
1-13 (Oxford 1976) (describing the early twentieth-century elite as self-interested and bigoted); Marc Gal-
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The legal elite's original and uniquely American 9 understanding of the lawyer's role was that lawyers were America's governing class. Leading lawyers,
judges and scholars, including the first American legal ethicists, sought to explain how the common good, minority rights and the rule of law could coexist
with majority rule by an electorate largely composed of self-interested voters.
They decided that the answer was a governing class of lawyers. With their dedication to the common good and their placement in the center of commerce and
governance, lawyers were ideally suited for political leadership10
This perspective did not exclude the lawyer's role as representative of clients. It included and bounded it. One of the major components of the legal
elite's conception of lawyering was that lawyers exert influence on their clients,
in addition to the influence lawyers wielded through their political leadership
and their function in interpreting the law for the public. When representing clients, advocacy and governance duties could often coexist but when they conflicted the legal elite believed that the governing class duty was paramount"n
During its period of dominance, the governing class idea did not go unchallenged. Some argued that lawyers should serve exclusively as advocates for their
clients within the bounds of the law. Others questioned lawyers' commitment to
the common good. They asserted that self-interested lawyers were not entitled
to serve as the governing class. Despite these challenges, the legal elite maintained their vision of lawyers as the governing class through the 1960s.12
While most commentators have not directly discussed the subsequent collapse of the governing class ideology, they have sought to explain the end of
American lawyers' commitment to serving the public good in the context of the
decline of professionalism. They commonly have attributed this transformation
to developments in several areas affecting the profession's view of itself, including changes in the legal services market, ethical rules governing the marketing of
3
legal services, legal education, and the diversity of bar membership.1
This article suggests instead that other factors were at work. In American
society as a whole, the sense of community obligation declined as the focus on
individualism rose in the years following the 1960s. At the same time, the public

anter, Lawyers in the Mist:. The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 Dick L Rev 549 (1996) (questioning the
existence of "Golden Ages" of the legal profession); Shamir, ManagingLegal Uncertaintyat 13 (cited in note

7) (finding corporate lawyers' opposition to the New Deal grounded in their interest in protecting their
"perceived autonomous domain').

9.

Although other legal traditions envisioned lawyers as disinterested and as having some respon-

sibility for governance, none were so ambitious as the American conception of the disinterested governing
class. See, for example, Samuel Haber, The.QuestforAuthoiy and Honorin the American Professions 1750-1900
7-8 (Chicago 1991) (describing the English gentleman-lawyer); John Leubsdorf, Man in his OrginalDigniy:

LegalEthicsin Franceix-xi (Ashgate 2000) (describing the French bar). See also note 53.
10. See Part LA below.
11. See id.
12. See Parts I.B. and II below.
13. See Part lII.B below.
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became skeptical of the expertise of elites generally, and leading members of the
public, including lawyers, doubted whether lawyers were capable of perceiving
and pursuing the public good. Two trends within the legal profession also contributed to this transformation during the post-1960s period. First, the growth
of a large, distinct public interest bar led to a transfer of responsibility for the
public good from elite lawyers to public interest lawyers and to a redefinition of
the "public good" that conflicted with the interests of big business clients. Second, the related development of the idea of a pro bono duty offered those elite
lawyers who still clung to a semblance of the governing class idea an opportunity to satisfy their community obligations through their pro bono work. Unlike
the Wall Street lawyers of the early 1960s, who viewed themselves as servants of
the public in all areas of their work, the elite came to view themselves as hired
guns-lawyers devoted to their clients who served the public only in their lim14
ited and separate pro bono efforts.
Although the rhetoric of the governing class lives on in hortatory appeals to
pro bono responsibility and the "'hazy aspirational world' of the 'Law Day Sermon,"'" 5 it no longer rules the conscience of the legal elite. After more than 200
years, the elite lawyers' allegiance to the idea that they are America's governing
class appears to have come to an end.
I THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNING CLASS IDEA

A. THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S ROLE
In the view of most historians, "the dominant ideological force behind the
American Revolution" was republicanism.' 6 William Treanor has observed that
"[a]t the center of republican thought lay a belief in a common good and a conception of society as an organic whole. The state's proper role consisted in large
part of fostering virtue, of making the individual unselfishly devote himself to

14. See Part IILC below.
15. Pearce, 27 Fla St U L Rev at 9 (cited in note 5), quoting Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Layers, 68 BU L Rev 1, 13 (1988).
16. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 251 (cited in note 5). See, for example, Gordon Wood, Hellfire
Politics, NY Rev of Books 28 (Feb 28, 1985) (discussing the historical literature); Robert Shalhope, Republicanism and Earj1 American Historiography, 39 Wm & Mary Q 334, 334-37 (1982) (same); William Michael
Treanor, Taking the FramersSeriousjy, 55 U Chi L Rev 1016, 1032 (1988), reviewing Walter Berns, Taking the
Constitution Seriousy (Simon & Schuster 1987) (same). As I have written elsewhere, "[hlistorians have traced
the roots of republicanism to ancient Rome, Renaissance Italy, and to English opposition thought." Pearce,
6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 250 (cited in note 5) (footnotes omitted). See also Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution 22-93 (Belknap 1967) (finding sources in ancient Rome and English opposition thought); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 46-90 (North Carolina 1969)
(finding sources in English opposition thought); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Stud
in Histo9 "and Ideology, 53 J Mod Hist 49 (1981) (finding source in Renaissance Italy).
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the common good." 17 Acting collectively through their representatives, the people would pursue the common good and protect individual liberty.18 Republics
compared favorably to monarchies like England, which "sacific[ed] . . .the
public good to the private greed of small ruling groups."'19
The civic virtue necessary to republican government required "equal, active,
and independent citizens"20 who were willing to be "disinterested" 2' and "to
sacrifice... private interests for the good of the community."22 Republican idealists believed that all or most people were capable of civic virtue.23 But others
feared that persons "involved in the marketplace were usually overwhelmed by
their interests and were incapable of disinterestedness." 24 They preferred the
"disinterested leadership" of the "landed gentry" who were free from the influence of the market25 or of professionals who were not wholly reliant "on their
work as a source of income." 26 Other republican thinkers were hostile to wealth
altogether on the grounds that it "encouraged greed in its possessors and enabled them to wield undue power."27
In the period following the American Revolution, a number of political
thinkers lost confidence in traditional republcanism's promise that the people as
a whole would rise above self-interest to virtue.28 These thinkers came to believe
that "the people were perverting their liberty" and their power with selfinterested pursuits. 29 The unlimited power of legislatures led to a new form of
tyranny where the majority pursued its self-interest at the expense of the common good and of individual rights, particularly property rights. 3 0 These circumstances forced many republican thinkers to reconsider how to maintain a republican form of government, a commitment to the common good, and respect for
individual rights.
17. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Originsand OdginalSignificance
of the Just Compensation Clause of
the FffthAmendment, 94 Yale LJ 694, 699 (1985).
18. Treanor, 55 U Chi L Rev at 1033 (cited in note 16); Wood, The Creationof theAmericanRepublic at
60-63, 162-65 (cited in note 16); Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 188-89 (Knopf
1991).
19. Wood, The Creation oftheAmerican Republic at 54 (cited in note 16).
20. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 104 (cited in note 18). Wood also uses the
terms "public virtue" and "civic virtue" interchangeably.
21. Id at 105.
22.

Wood, The Creation oftheAmerican Republic at 68 (cited in note 16).

23. Id at 57-72, 164-65; Wood, The Radicalism ofthe American Revolution at 106 (cited in note 18).
24. Wood, The Radicalism ofthe American Revolution at 106 (cited in note 18).
25. Id. Wood also suggests that a liberal education could counteract the influence of commerce. Id
at 107.
26. Id.
27. Treanor, 94 Yale L J at 699 (cited in note 17); Wood, The Creationofthe American Republic at 70
(cited in note 16).
28. See, for example, Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 104-06 (cited in note 18);
Treanor, 94 Yale LJ at 699-70 (cited in note 17).
29. Wood, The Creation oftheAmerican Republic at 403 (cited in note 16).
30. Id at 403-09; Treanor, 55 U Chi L Rev at 1033 (cited in note 16).
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Many of the framers of the Constitution sought the solution to this dilemma
ina modified form of republicanism. While advocating a government of "limited powers subject to elaborate checks and balances ... intended to limit majoritarian excesses," 31 they sought a virtuous political elite. Building on the elitist
strand of republicanism, which had preferred the political leadership of landed
gentry and professionals, 32 they found in these two groups the capacity for disin33
terestedness "necessary to virtue and realization of the common good."
Gordon Wood explains this preference: The "disinterested gentry... were supported by proprietary wealth and not involved in the interest-mongering of the
market place," 34 and similarly, "lawyers and other professionals [were] somehow
free of the marketplace, [were] less selfish and interested and therefore better
equipped for political leadership and disinterested decision-making than mer35
chants and businessmen."
Federalist No. 35 went so far as to identify professionals as the most virtuous members of this emerging governing class. While even the landed gentry
would seek to protect and promote its own financial interests, 36 lawyers and
other members of the "learned professions... truly form[ed] no distinct interest
in society." 37 Such professionals "will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between
the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive
to the general interests of the society." 38 Implicit in this distinction between
professionals and other businesses was the "Business-Profession dichotomy,"
which would become central to the governing class conception of the lawyer's
role. 39 What links Federalist No. 35 to the elite lawyers' conception of their place
in society is the fundamental belief that, in contrast to business persons who

31. Treanor, 55 U Chi L Rev at 1033-34 (cited in note 16).
32. Wood, The Radicalism ofthe American Revolution at 106-07 (cited in note 18).
33. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 251 (cited in note 5). For further discussion of the development
of modified republicanism, see id at 251-52; Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Propery and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism170-83 (Chicago 1990).
34. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 253 (cited in note 18).

35.

Id at 254.

36. Federalist 35 (Alexander Hamilton), in Benjamin F. Wright, ed, The Federalist 257 (Belknap
1961).
37. Id at 256.
38. Id at 258.
39. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1230-31, 1241-42 (cited in note 5). See also Wood, The Radcalism of the
American Revolution at 254 (cited in note 18) (observing that the perspective of Federalist No. 35 "reinforced
a notion that has carried into our own time"'). The influence of this idea has extended beyond the members
of the legal profession. As Richard Abel has noted, sociologists, such as the eminent scholar Talcott Parsons, who propound "structural functional theories of the professions," maintain that professions, "if
protected from outside interference, ... will use their expertise for the public good." Richard L. Abel,
American Lanyers 35 (Oxford 1989). In particular, Parsons describes lawyers as serving a vital role in capitalist society as "a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of... clients and the social interest." Talcott
Parsons, The Law andSocial Control, in William M. Evan, ed, Law and Sociology 69 (Free Press 1962).
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pursue their self-interest, professionals pursue the public good. 40
Federalist No. 35's Business-Profession dichotomy thus provided the foundation for an ideology that propelled lawyers to political leadership from an
earlier position of disarray.41 America lacked its own published "reports or state
precedents," much less "American lawbooks," institutions for legal education, 42
or a corps of legally trained judges 43 Exacerbating this situation was the departure of the large number of lawyers who had been Tories.44 Many of those who
left were the best trained. Their departure left a "generation gap" in the profession.45 And while many lawyers had been prominent Revolutionary leaders 46 the
Revolutionary ideology placed lawyers on the defensive. The egalitarianism of
Revolutionary republicanism, together with antagonism to Tory lawyers and
lawyer defenders of Tory property rights, exacerbated already existing public
hostility toward lawyers. 47
The modified Republicanism embodied in the Constitution and Federalist
No. 35, together with the vital role American lawyers played in formal and informal governance, provided the ideological tools for transforming lawyers'
"chaotic condition" to one "of political and intellectual domination." 48 Under
the new Constitution, the American Republic was very much one of judicial law.
Unlike the British tradition, which placed supreme authority in Parliament, the

American Constitution stated "fundamental principles [n] explicit rules set out
in statutelike form that might be interpreted and given force by the courts." 49

The emerging independent judiciary in the early nineteenth century imposed the
common law50 and protected the rule of law and individual rights from majority

tyranny.51 In partnership with judges, lawyers became the "ex officio interpreter[s]
of our national credo.

'5 2

Lawyers controlled the judicial branch and dominated

53
the legislature and the executive.

40. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1230-31,1241-42 (cited in note 5).
41. Wood, The Radicalism of the Amredcan Revointon at 346 (cited in note 18). See Gordon, 68 BU L
Rev at 14 (cited in note 15).
42. Miller, The Le of the Mind inAmredca at 109 (cited in note 7).
43. Id at 134.
44. Id at 111 (noting bar leader's assertion "that the majority of Massachusetts barristers and attorneys had proved Tory or at least neutral"); Haber, The.QuestforAuthody andHonor in the American Professions
at 78 (cited in note 9) (observing that "the majority of the New York and Philadelphia bar may have sided
with the King); Maxwell Bloomfield, American Layers in a ChangingSoiey 1776-1876 139 (Harvard 1976)
(noting research suggesting that "one-fourth of all prewar practitioners joined the Tory exodus").
45. Bloomfield, AmericanLaigers in a ChangingSodey at 139 (cited in note 44).
46. Haber, The .QuestforAuthody andHonorin the American Professions at 78 (cited in note 9).
47. Bloomfield, American Lany-ers in a ChangingSodey at 39-43 (cited in note 44); Haber, The.Questfor
Authody andHonorin the American Professionsat 77 (cited in note 9).
48. Miller, The Lif ofthe Mind in America at 109 (cited in note 7).
49. Haber, The .QuestforAutorryandHonor in the Ameican Professionsat 68 (cited in note 9).
50. Miller, The Lif of the Mind in Ameica at 105-09 (cited in note 7).
51. Wood, The Radicalism oftheAmerican Revolution at 323 (cited in note 18).
52. Haber, The .QnestforAuthoi0 andHonorin the American Professionsat 68 (cited in note 9).
53. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law 110 (Simon & Schuster 2d ed 1985); Gordon,
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While jurists like James Kent and Joseph Story played a leading role in this
transformation, Miller attributes "the first comprehensive statement of the [lawyer's] calling" to lawyer and law professor David Hoffman. 54 The son of a
"prosperous [Baltimore] mercantile family," Hoffman was born in 1784. 55 In
contrast to his seven older brothers who entered "trade" as merchants, Hoffman entered the law to engage in a "learned profession. '56 A scholarly and ambitious practitioner, 7 he received an appointment in 1814 as a Professor of Law
58
at one of the nation's earliest law schools, the fledgling University of Maryland.
He earned national attention three years later with publication of his famous
treatise, A Course of LegalStudy. 59 Joseph Story gave Hoffman's work an excellent
review, 60 and used it as the foundation for his curriculum at Harvard Law
61
School.
Hoffman's exposition of lawyers as America's governing class combined the
vision of the professional's commitment to the common good found in Federalist No. 35 with the view that lawyers were responsible for governance. Hoffman's lawyers were practitioners of the science of justice. 62 Their "vocation is
the protection of the injured and the innocent, the defence of the weak and the
poor, the conservation of the rights and prosperity of the citizen, and the vigor68 BU L Rev at 15 (cited in note 15); Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 254-55 (cited in note 5). In advancing
the conception of lawyers as a governing class, American lawyers far exceeded the status and authority that
lawyers in England derived from their role as gentlemen and guild members. See, for example, Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democragy in America 268 (Harper Perennial 1969) (contrasting the status of English and
American lawyers); Haber, The QuestforAuthoriy andHonor in the American Professions at 67 (cited in note 9)
(noting that "the American lawyer ultimately achieved an importance in this country that far surpassed that
of his counterpart in Britain"); Miller, The Lie of the Mind in America at 113 (cited in note 7) (reporting
David Hoffman's claim that American lawyers held "a more exalted rank" than lawyers in other countries).
While the republican notion of disinterested leadership built on the English inheritance of the disinterested gentleman and guild traditions of autonomy and craft excellence, the governing class aspiration was
uniquely American. See Haber, The.QuestforAuthoriy andHonorin the American Professions at 78 (cited in note
9); Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 254-55 (cited in note 18); Krause, Death of the Guilds at
3-6 (cited in note 5). But see Haber, The QuestforAuthoriy and Honor in the American Professions at 78 (cited in
note 9) (finding the origins of American lawyer's role in the notion of the English lawyer-gentleman);
Krause, Death of the Guilds at 29-32, 49-54 (cited in note 5) (describing the American bar as a surviving
guild); Richard Posner, Overcoming Law 37-60 (Harvard 1995) (same).
54. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 113 (cited in note 7).
55. Maxwell Bloomfield, DavidHoffman and the Shapingof a Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md L Rev 673,
674 (1979).
56. Id at 674-75.
57. Id at 676 (further describing Hoffman as "always insecure, vain, and neurotic-hungry for the
deference and material comforts to which he believed intellectuals were automatically entitled').
58. Id at 678; Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law at 320-21 (cited in note 53).
59. Bloomfield, 38 Md L Rev at 678 (cited in note 55). See David Hoffman, Course of Legal Study 0.
Neal 2d ed 1836).
60. Bloomfield, 38 Md L Rev at 679 (cited in note 55); Miller, The Life ofthe Mind in America at 127
(cited in note 7).
61. Bloomfield, 38 Md L Rev at 686 (cited in note 55).
62. Hoffman, 1 Course of Legal Study at 26-27 (cited in note 59). See Miller, The Life of the Mind in
America at 159 (cited in note 7) ("credit[ing Hoffman] for solidly propounding the large conception of
American law as a science rather than a mere accretion').
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ous maintenance of the legitimate and wholesome powers of government" 63
What enabled lawyers to fulfill their governing class role was that "great[ness] in
law [required] great[ness] in every virtue" 64 and a "steady, and liberal
understanding by which general consequences are regarded instead of particular,
and general justice is distributed, without reference to private or partial
inconvenience."65 Lawyers were "the most entrusted, the most honoured, and
66
withal, the most efficient and useful body of men" in America.
Hoffman applied the governing class ideal to the attorney-client relationship
with a vengeance. Hoffman's lawyer always put the public good above all else.
In his fifty "Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment," 67 the first wellknown American code of ethics for lawyers, 68 Hoffman asserted that the virtuous lawyer should reject any distinction between personal and professional morality. 69 Hoffman noted that "[w]hat is morally wrong, cannot be professionally
right."70 He urged lawyers not to pursue a claim or defense which "cannot, or
rather ought not, to be sustained,"71 not to plead the Statute of Limitation or
'ancy...
against an honest demand," 72 and not to use "ingenuity" to assist
the guilty.73 Hoffman counseled the lawyer to keep his "conscience" distinct
from the client's and to refuse to argue facts the lawyer finds doubtful or principles "wholly at variance with sound law."74 In offering an opinion to a client,
lawyers "should act asjudges, responsible to God and to man." 75
While Hoffman's Resolutions continued to capture the imagination of the
legal elite through the twentieth century,7 6 their importance in shaping the field
of American legal ethics was overshadowed by the work of George Sharswood,
an author whose own governing class perspective afforded greater room for
client advocacy?77 A distinguished lawyer, judge, and scholar, George Sharswood
was in 1854 the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.78 That
year, he published his lectures on legal ethics as a book-length essay that would

63. Hoffman, 1 Courseof LegalStudy at 26 (cited in note 59).
64. Id at 26-27.
65. Miller, The Life ofthe Mind inAmeica at 113 (cited in note 7) (quoting Hoffman).
66. Id at 105 (quoting Hoffman).
67. Hoffman, 2 Courseof IgalStudy at 752-75 (cited in note 59).
68. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 250 n 60 (cited in note 5).
69. Bloomfield, 38 Md L Rev at 684 (cited in note 55).
70. Hoffman, 2 Courseof Lga Study at 765 (cited in note 59).
71. Id at 754.
72. Id.
73. Id at 755-56.
74. Id at 755.
75. Id at 764.
76. When the American Bar Association decided to create its first code of ethics, the drafting
committee reviewed and published Hoffman's Resolutions. Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 243 n 13 (cited
in note 5).
77. Id (describing Sharswood's role as the father of modem legal ethics).
78. Id at 248-49.
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dominate the field of legal ethics for the next hundred years.79
While both Hoffman and Sharswood viewed lawyers as America's governing class, Sharswood provided a more comprehensive and elaborate explanation
of that role. Like Federalist No. 35 and Hoffman, Sharswood viewed lawyers as
uniquely capable of identifying and pursuing the public good. As I have written
elsewhere, Sharswood described lawyers as "experts schooled in the science of
law and capable of impartial, or in classic republic terms 'virtuous' legislation
and jurisprudence." 80 Like Hoffman, Sharswood endorsed the notion that "no
man can ever be a truly great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the word, a
good man." 81 Indeed, Sharswood asserted that an invisible hand of reputation
ensured that the most virtuous lawyers would be the most financially successful.82

Lawyers' virtue and expertise, together with the important role they played
in governance, earned them their place as America's political leadership. Sharswood explained that lawyers, "more frequently than . . . any other profession,... fill the highest public stations. '83 Their governing class role extended as
well to their work as private lawyers. When "providing counsel to clients, making arguments in court to judge and jury," 84 and publishing "works of research
and learning,"85 private lawyers "diffuse[d] sound principles among the peo87
ple" 86 and brought the law "home... to every man's fireside."
As America's governing class, lawyers had an obligation to promote the rule
of law and the protection of individual rights. They were to protect property and
contract rights from the oppression of majority rule, promote respect for precedent and for the judicial branch, and oppose legislation that favored one class at
the expense of another. 88 To do so, as I have noted elsewhere, they would have
to use "the language of democracy and equality . . . to defend counter79. Bloomfield, 38 Md L Rev at 687 (cited in note 55); Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 243-47, 27778 n 287 (cited in note 5). This article relies on the fifth edition of Sharswood's work. George Sharswood,
An Essay on ProfessionalEthics (cited in note 7). As I have noted earlier, the drafters of the ABA Canons of
Ethics reprinted this edition for distribution to the ABA membership. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 243
n 13 (cited in note 5).
80. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 255 (cited in note 5).
81.
Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthicsat 168 (cited in note 7). Sharswood further noted that
"[tlhere is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more
imperatively necessary than that of the law." Id at 55.
82. Id at 75. He believed that "the real public-the business men of the community, who have
important lawsuits, and are valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of
the Bar, unless indeed there be some glaring defect of popular qualities." Id.
83. Id at 26. See also id at 30-31. Sharswood observed that "[t]hey will continue to do so, at least so
long as the profession holds the high and well-merited place it now does in the public confidence." Id at
54. See Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 255 (cited in note 5).
84. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 256 (cited in note 5).
85. Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics at 30 (cited in note 7).
86. Id at 54, 30.
87. Idat31.
88. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 255 (cited in note 5).
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majoritarian values." 89 Their role was to explain "that a legal system that respected order and property would provide equal justice under law, and would
protect the widow and orphan as well as the person of business."90
In translating the governing class role into the attorney-client relationship,
Sharswood blended the public good with client advocacy in a way that afforded
more deference to client interests than Hoffman's Resolutions. Sharswood rejected both the hired gun view that "all causes are to be taken by [a lawyer] indiscriminately, and conducted with a view to one single end, succes '91 and the
opposite view, closer to Hoffman's, that the lawyer should act like a judge and
only assist clients with just causes.92
Sharswood distinguished between public affairs and client matters. In public
office and on matters of public policy, the lawyer must always pursue the common good.93 In representing private clients, the lawyer's governing class obligations bounded, and in some cases reinforced, client advocacy. Although the
lawyer generally owed the private client "warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of his rights," 94 private prosecutors and plaintiff's lawyers, who sought to
use the coercive power of the state on behalf of their clients, were obligated to
pursue "justice even to the extent of refusing to pursue lawful but immoral
goals."95 When defending a client, the duties of advocacy and governance were
often, but not always, identical. As the governing class, lawyers were "the bulwark of private rights against the assaults of power." 96 The criminal defendant
was always entitled to zealous representation in order to vindicate the defendanes basic constitutional rightsP 7 The civil defendant's situation was similar in
that a civil "defendant has a legal right to require that the plaintiffs demand
against him should be proved and proceeded according to law." 98 Sharswood
bounded these obligations with governing class duties to maintain the lawyer's
personal integrity and, in civil matters, to avoid frustrating legitimate property
rights, and to limit defense against a "'righteous claim'... to assuring the defendant 'a fair trial on the merits in open court." 99
89.
90.

Id at 256.
Id.

91.

Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthicsat 84 (cited in note 7).

92.
93.

Id at 88.
Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 254-55 (cited in note 5).

94.

Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics at 78-79 (cited in note 7). Sharswood prescribed the

"duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and competence which comprise much of the modem ethics of lawyering," including the right of the guilty to confidentiality and zealous representation. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal
Ethics at 261-65 (cited in note 5).
95. Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 264 (cited in note 5).
96. Sharswood, An Essay on ProfssionalEthicsat 53-54 (cited in note 7).
97. Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 265 (cited in note 5).
98. Sharswood, An Essa on ProfessionalEthicsat 95-96 (cited in note 7). See Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal
Ethics at 265 (cited in note 5).
99. Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 266 (cited in note 5), quoting Sharswood, An Essay on Professional
Ethics at 98-99 (cited in note 7).
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Lawyers like Sharswood and Hoffman were not the only ones to view lawyers as America's governing class. In his famous commentary on America in the
1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville found lawyers to be the managers of American
democracy. They were responsible for promoting republican government and
protecting minority and individual rights. Lawyers favored democratic government; a democracy, in contrast to an aristocracy or an oligarchy, empowered
lawyers to serve as the "political upper class."' ° Yet their tastes and experience
drew them toward the propertied classes and away from the masses. 101 Serving
"as arbiters between the citizens," "directing the blind passions of the litigants
toward the objective,"' 02 and familiarizing juries with "the spirit of the law,"
lawyers promoted in "the whole people" an acceptance of counter-majoritarian
values such as individual rights and rule of law. 10 3 Tocqueville concluded that
"the American aristocracy is found... at the bar or the bench."' 4
B. CHALLENGES TO THE GOVERNING CLASS IDEA
Although dominant among the legal elite, the republican notion of lawyers
was not the only conception of the American lawyer's role. At the same time
Hoffman and Sharswood propounded the governing class ideal, they responded
to attacks from inside and outside the bar.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, legislatures asserted their authority to override bar and judicial regulation of admission to practice.' 05 In so doing, they eased admission requirements dramatically. Lawrence Friedman notes
that "[i]n 1800, fourteen out of the nineteen states or organized territories prescribed a definite period of preparation of the bar. In 1840, only eleven of thirty
jurisdictions did so."106 Indeed, "a few states eliminated all requirements for
1 07
admission to the bar, except good moral character."'
Hostility from those who viewed lawyers as self-interested contributed significantly to these legislative changes.'0 8 America had a "venerable history" of

100. TocqueviUe, Democray in America at 268 (cited in note 53).
101.
Id at 266.
102. Id at 264.
103. Id at 270.
104. Id at 268.
105. Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Anfiqui y to Modem Times 223-37 (West 1953). Bloomfield takes
issue with the views of Pound and other historians that the developments of the mid-nineteenth century
led to a "decline in professional competence that allegedly accompanied the assaults of a militant democracy." Bloomfield, American Layers in a Cbanging Sodety at 136 (cited in note 44). Bloomfield argues that the
hostility toward lawyers in this period did not represent a major change and that the "technical competence" of lawyers represented "no sharp break with the past." Id at 137-38. This article need not resolve
these differences. The focus of this piece is the ideology of lawyers and not their actual conduct.
106. Friedman, A Histogy ofAmerican Law at 316 (cited in note 53).
107. Id at 317.
108. Other reasons for these legislative developments were the absence of strong governmental regulation of occupations generally and the existence of easy "geographicf and social mobility." Id at 317.
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"[a]nti-lawyer sentiment" which held lawyers to be no better than "scoundrel[s]."109 Many rejected the notion that lawyers were entitled to serve as America's enlightened political leadership. They viewed any notion of a disinterested
elite as anti-democratic" 0 and decried an independent judiciary as "lawyers
law.""' One such commentator denounced lawyers as "the unanointed rulers of
the land."11 2
Even many "rank and file" lawyers viewed themselves in practical terms that
denied the distinction between a business and a profession, the foundation of
the lawyer's governing class role." 3 An 1856 article by a lawyer in the American
Law Register asserted that "[w]e are clever men of business, as a mass, and no
more. It is our BUSINESS TALENTS, our PROMPTNESS, ACCURACY, and
114
DILIGENCE, that commands success, respect and influence."
Another challenge to the governing class ideal arose from the lawyer's advocacy role. Lawyers and non-lawyers observed that a lawyer's pursuit of a client's
goals necessarily prevented lawyers from pursuing the common good. Some
Christian commentators, including many participating in the nineteenth-century
revivals, used arguments dating to the Puritans. They asserted that only one side
in a dispute was in the right and that because lawyers would represent the wrong
as well as the right, they were willing to promote evil."15 They "portrayed the
successful lawyer as nothing better than a sort of licensed knave, a minister of
6
Satan."11
7
Sharswood responded to these charges with a defense of the legal system."
He argued that the alternative to professional representation of clients by lawyers was to permit the "court or jury ... arbitrary discretion to determine a
cause according to their mere notion of justice.""18 He maintained that a system
of "justice according to law," administered by experts in the law, was "[t]he only
secure principle upon which the controversies of men can be decided, [even if] a
Bloomfield further suggests that these changes resulted from "the insistence of an ever expanding bourgeoisie upon increased legal services and an updated recruitment program geared to changing population
trends and the rise of marginal social groups to positions of status and power." Bloomfield, American Law-

eirsin a ChangingSodey at 138 (cited in note 44).
109. Haber, The.QuestforAuthorio andHonorin theAmerican Professionsat 77 (cited in note 9).
110. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 255 (cited in note 18).
111. Id at 323; Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 108 (cited in note 7). They also regarded "the
law as an artificial imposition on their native intelligence and judges as agents of constraint." Miller, The
Life ofthe Mind in America at 102 (cited in note 7).
112. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 242 (cited in note 7), quotingJohn Neal, Address to Waterville College (1830).
113. Bloomfield, American Langers in a Changing SodeDy at 151 (cited in note 44) (contrasting the "rank
and file" perspective with the view of "scholarly jurists such as Kent, Story, and David Hoffman").
114. Id at 151, quoting Oftce Dutie, 4Am L Register 193 (1856).
115. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 104 (cited in note 7). See Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at
249-50 (cited in note 5).
116. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 187 (cited in note 7).
117. Sharswood,AnEssy on ProfessionalEthicsat 81 (cited in note 7).
118. Id at 82.
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few particular cases or hardship and injustice aris[e]." 9
Some lawyers who embraced the advocacy role questioned whether lawyers
could be a disinterested governing class. Perhaps the most famous early nineteenth-century statement of the advocate's credo was that of Lord Henry
Brougham in 1820.120 At the time, Brougham was the leader of those in the
House of Lords who were defending Queen Caroline against King George IV's
charges of adultery.121 He had learned that the King had secretly married a Roman Catholic before assuming the throne and therefore was ineligible to rule. 122
If revealed, this information would have created turmoil, potentially resulting in
a civil war.123
Brougham wanted the King and his allies to know that he would reveal the
King's prior marriage if the matter was not settled satisfactorily for Queen Caroline. 124 On the floor of the House of Lords, Brougham dedared that:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them to himself, is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments,
the destruction he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of advocate, he must go on, reckless of consequences: though it should be his
15
unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion. '

Brougham's advocate was not a member of the governing class in the American
sense. He did not identify and pursue the common good. He knew and pursued
only the interests of "one person in all the world, and that person is his client." 26 According to Brougham, the advocate had a duty to ignore "hazards and
costs to other persons," even when they would result in "alarm," "torments,"
and "destruction."' 127 When forced to balance the interests of his country against
that of his client, Brougham's credo was clear. The advocate's duty was not that
"of a patriot."' 28 He should be willing to "involve his country in confusion" for
129
his client's sake.
119. Id.
120.

See, for example, Freedman, Understanding Lanyers' Ethics at 65-66 (cited in note 5) (identifying

Brougham's statement as the "classic statement" of the advocate's role); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future
of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L J 1239, 1244 (1991) (asserting that Brougham's statement reflects "I[the legal

profession's basic narrative").
121.
122.

David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lanyer 188-89 (West 1973).
Id; L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawer's Dusy of Lqyaly, 29 Emory L J 909, 909-10

(1980).
123.
124.

Patterson, 29 Emory LJ at 910 (cited in note 122).
Id; Mellinkoff, The Conscience ofa Layer at 188-89 (cited in note 121).

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics at 87 (cited in note 7) (quoting Brougham).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Speaking for the legal elite, Sharswood and Hoffman rejected this view.
Both circumscribed the advocate's role, though Hoffman far more than Sharswood, and both viewed the lawyer's identification with the client as a potential
threat to the governing class role. 30 Sharswood expressly disagreed with
Brougham. Acknowledging that many shared Brougham's perspective, Sharswood quoted with approval the words of Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Gibson asserted that "[i]t is a popular but gross mistake,... to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except his client,
and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience." 131 Sharswood
endorsed Gibson's conclusion that "[t]he high and honorable office of a counsel
would be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings
of his client against the dictates of his conscience." 132
II. PROFESSIONALISM PRESERVES TiE GOVERNING CLASS
IDEOLOGY

After the civil war, the legal elite lost faith in the republican promise that individual lawyers and the invisible hand of reputation would ensure that lawyers
would commit themselves to the common good. Rather than abandon the governing class idea, however, they turned to a new paradigm. Professionalism offered a formula for preserving lawyers' status as the governing class. Admitting
that some individual lawyers failed to meet high standards, professionalism proposed that an organized bar would police itself in the interest of the common
good. With a somewhat different definition of the good than republicanism, and
despite instability inherent in professionalism, most of the legal elite maintained
their faith in the professionalism paradigm through the 1960s.
A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARADIGM
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, lawyers and non-lawyers questioned whether lawyers were fulfilling their governing class obligations. Robert
Wiebe has noted that "[w]ith the exception of bankers, no group late in the
nineteenth century stood in lower public repute."1 33 The republican paradigm of
individual lawyers "serv[mg] as guardians of the public good[] appeared power-

130.

Hoffman, 2 Course of LegalStudy at 745 (cited in note 59) (warning lawyers to avoid having "the

interests and feelings of the [lawyer] become in a measure identified with those of the [client]'); Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics at 101 (cited in note 7) (quoting with approval Whewell's caution

against a lawyer's immoral "mix[mg] up his character as an advocate with his character as a moral agent,
using his moral influence for the advocate's purpose").
131. Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthicsat 96-97 (cited in note 7), quoting Rush v Cavenaugb, 2
Barr 189.
132. Id.
133. Robert H. Wiebe, The SearrbforOrder 1877-1920 116 (Hill and Wang 1967).
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less to prevent this decline."' 34
The decline was often expressed as the forsaking of the distinction between
a business and profession. John R. Dos Passos complained of the "transformation from a profession to a business."' 35 Robert Gordon notes "the extraordinary outpouring of rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal-bar association and law school commencement addresses, memorial speeches on colleagues, articles and books-on the theme of the profession's 'decline from a
' 36
profession to a business."
One threat was from the rank-and-file lawyers who did not possess the disinterestedness of the governing class. Supreme Court Justice David Brewer described this problem as follows:
A growing multitude is crowding in who are not fit to be lawyers, who disgrace the
profession after they are in it, who in a scramble after livelihood are debasing the
noblest of professions into the meanest of avocations, who instead of being leaders and looked up to for advice and guidance, are despised hangers-on of police
CoUrtS.

! 37

This problematic "multitude" had two components. One was the burgeoning
number of immigrant lawyers. Members of the predominantly white AngloSaxon Protestant legal elite were horrified as "changing immigration and demographic patterns swelled.., the profession with the foreign-born and their children." 38 Their background alone disqualified them from the republican virtue
necessary to provide political leadership. As a New York State Bar President
observed: "men are seen in almost all our courts slovenly in dress, uncouth in
manners and habits, ignorant even of the English language, jostling, crowding,
vulgarizing the profession."' 139 One leading attorney noted that immigrants
lacked "the incalculable advantage of having been brought up in the American
family life," and, therefore, "they 'can hardly be taught the ethics of the profession as adequately as we desire.""' 140 The second problematic aspect of the multitude was their business-like behavior. A burgeoning plaintiff's bar, including
immigrants and children of immigrants, represented plaintiffs for contingency
fees. Not only did personal injury work provide a lucrative career for the "upstart lawyer without connections," 14' it also provided the foundation for larger
134.

Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1241 (cited in note 5).

135.

Quoted in Auerbach, UnequalJusticeat 33 (cited in note 8).

136. Robert Gordon, 'The Ideal and the Actual in the Law". Fantasies of New York Ciy Lawyers, 18701910, in Gerald W. Gawalt, ed, The New High Priests:Lawyers in Post-Civil War America 51, 61 (Greenwood
1984). See also Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 33 (cited in note 8); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From
B'an to F.D.R. 158 (Alfred A. Knopf 1955).
137. Haber, The Questfor Authoriy andHonorin the American Professions at 228 (cited in note 9).
138. Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 5 (cited in note 8).
139. Id at 51.
140. Id at 100.
141. Haber, The QuestforAuhoriyandHonorinthe American Professions at 223 (cited in note 9).
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enterprises. One such firm claimed to have offices in thirty-two cities, while
another "maintain[ed] a hospital and a medical staff."142
In the eyes of many in the legal elite, the lawyers who worked for contingency fees were 'ambulance chaser[s]' [who] drummed up business with an eye
to 'mere pelf."'143 As Samuel Haber notes, "[t]here was a whiff of class struggle
surrounding the discussion of these injury cases, and lawyers who lived off such
litigation were quickly cast as disreputable fomenters, ambulance chasers, and
shysters."' 44 This new breed of lawyer certainly lacked the disinterested virtue
necessary to sustain the governing class.
The elite also appeared to have forsaken the role of disinterested professionals. The work of lawyers for large corporations had begun to resemble business work. Commentators described newly emerging corporate law firms as
"law factories." 145 One referred to them as "a money-making mechanism, inelastic, rigorous, unsympathetic; into which the young man, just from his studies,
fits... like a fresh adjusted cog into a well-oiled machine."' 46
In these firms, lawyers were spending less time in the courtroom and more
time "in the law office and the conference room."1 47 Lawyers "were now doing
essentially business jobs, selling stocks and bonds, directing tactical maneuvers
in intercorporate warfare, and brokering deals among security holders of bankrupt corporations."' 148 The Business-Profession dichotomy further eroded as
lawyers joined "the boards of their major clients; and quite frequently left outside firm practice to become their principal client's chief executive or general
counsel." 149
Commentators viewed lawyers' resemblance to business people as more
than appearance. One prominent lawyer noted:
Our whole moral atmosphere is corrupted by a passion for sudden wealth. Can the
lawyer escape the moral influence which has proved so fatal to tradesmen, to
bankers, to all indeed in whom this passion is roused? His occupation brings him
into daily contact with them.... [H]ow few are superior to the passion for mere
wealth without the terrible sacrifice its gain may demand. 50

Elite lawyers had become "captive[s]" of their clients, 51 not servants of the public good.
142.

Julius H. Cohen, The Law: Business orProfession?183 (Banks Law 1916).

143. Haber, The.QuestforAuthoiy andHonor in the American Professions at 223 (cited in note 9).
144. Id at 227.
145. Wiebe, The Searchfor Orderat 294 (cited in note 133).
146. Auerbach, Unequaljusice at 31 (cited in note 8), quoting Charles F. Chamberlayne, The Sonl of the
Profession, 18 Green Bag 397 (1906).
147. Gordon, 'The IdealandtbeAclnal in the Law" at 59 (cited in note 136).
148. Id at 61.

149. Id.
150.
151.

Haber, The.QuestforAuthody andHonor in the American Professionsat 223 (cited in note 9).
Hofstadter, TheAge of Reform at 158 (cited in note 136).
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While transactional lawyers became more like business people, corporate
litigators found the hired gun role more appealing. Perhaps the best illustration
of this shift was the view of David Dudley Field, one of the leading lawyers of
the nineteenth century. In 1840, he rejected Lord Brougham's credo in favor of
a governing class approach.'5 2 In response to Brougham, he asserted that "a
more revolting doctrine scarcely ever fell from any man's lips. We think it un153
sound in theory and pernicious in practice."'
Almost thirty years later, Field found himself in the middle of Vanderbilt's
attempt to take over the Erie Railroad, which Mark DeWolfe Howe described as
a "corrupt comedy of ... counter injunctions."' 5 4 When Samuel Bowles, editor
of the Springield Republican, labeled Field "the king of pettifoggers," Field responded with a defense of his conduct.155 He rejected Bowles's contention that
lawyers had public duties. Instead, he argued that "the lawyer is responsible, not
for his clients, not for their causes, but for the manner in which he conducts
their causes."'1 6 Although he claimed that he did "not assent to the theory of
Brougham that the lawyer should know nobody but his client,"' 1 7 his formulation dramatically narrowed the lawyer's obligations to the public. Moreover,
commentators viewed the "conduct" of Field and the other lawyers in the Erie
matter to be scandalous. 5 8 When the legal elite organized the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, 159 it investigated "charges [filed] against Field with
the Association's committee on grievances for his actions in the Erie litigation"
as one of its first matters of business360
Not surprisingly, when the English visitor Bryce compared the state of the
American legal profession in 1885 to Toqueville's earlier observations, he
reached a completely different conclusion. In his well-known study, Bryce noted
that "the Bar counts for less as a guiding and restraining power, tempering the
crudity or haste of democracy by its attachment to rule and precedent, than it
did."'161 A few years later, Bryce attributed the decline of the governing class role

152. Miller, The Life ofthe Mind in America at 203-04 (cited in note 7).
153. Patterson, 29 Emory LJ at 951 (cited in note 121) (quoting Field).
154. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Book Review, 60 Harv L Rev 838, 841 (1947).
155. Shaffer, American Legal Ethics at 319 (cited in note 5).
156. Idat321.
157. Id at 327. Field continued: "I insist that [the lawyer] should defend his clientperfas and notper
nefas." Id.
158. George Martin, Causes and Conflicts: The CentennialHistogy of the Association of the Bar of/he City of
New York 1870-1970 14-15 (Houghton Mifflin 1970); Haber, The.QuestforAuthorio and Honorin the American
Professions at 209-10 (cited in note 9).
159. Martin, Causes and Conflicts at 15 (cited in note 158); Matzko, 'The Best Men ofthe Bar" at 80 (cited
in note 7) (observing that the organizers of the City Bar sought to restore "the honor, integrity, and fame
of the profession in its two manifestations of the Bench and Bar").
160. Martin, Causes and Conflicts at 91 (cited in note 158).
161. Louis Brandeis, Business: A Profession 333-34 (William S. Hein & Co 1996) (reprint of Hale,
Cushman & Flint 1993) (quoting Bryce in a speech given by Brandeis in 1905, entitled "Opportunity in the
Law," that is reprinted in its entirety in this book).
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to the demise of the Business-Profession dichotomy. He explained that
"[l]awyers are now to a greater extent than formerly business men, a part of the
great organized system of industrial and financial enterprise.... And they do
not seem to be so much of a distinct professional class." 162
B. THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Despite these challenges, the legal elite refused to abandon its governing
class ambition. It needed to find a new rationale for the continuation of the
governing class role that explained the failure of republicanism. It found this
account in professionalism.
Professionalism's solution was a self-policing organized bar under the leadership of its 'Best Men."' 163 Professionalism retained a belief in the capacity for
virtue of most lawyers and the general efficacy of the invisible hand of reputation.164 Nonetheless, it recognized that these conditions were not adequate to
ensure that lawyers worked in service of the public good. The legal elite created
bar associations that would add regulation necessary to prevent the wrong people from becoming lawyers and to sanction those lawyers who behaved unethically.165 The bar associations would control admissions to the bar in coordination with the judiciary 66 and would seek unauthorized practice statutes prohibiting other persons from practicing law.1 67 The bar would also create ethical codes
to educate lawyers on their duties and would discipline lawyers who failed to
68
meet high ethical standards1
The profession obtained the political and legal power necessary to accomplish these goals using the rhetoric of the governing class ideology's distinction
between a business and a profession. Only a profession promoting the public
good, and not profit, could obtain the agreement between society and the legal
profession that was the essence of professionalism. In exchange for the legal
profession's promise to regulate itself in the public interest, society agreed to
permit the profession autonomy. The conditions that made this bargain acceptable were lawyers' esoteric knowledge, which made lay regulation difficult, and
lawyers' altruistic commitment to place the interest of client and public above

162.

Id at 334.

163.

Matzko, 'The Best Men of the Bar" at 82 (cited in note 7).

164.

Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1242, 1245 (cited in note 5).

165. Haber, The .QuestforAulhouiy andHonorin the AmnericanProfessions at 211-13 (cited in note 9); Hofstadter, TheAge ofReforw at 157 (cited in note 136); Wiebe, The SearhforOrderat 117 (cited in note 133).
166. Wiebe, The Searchfor Orderat 117 (cited in note 133).
167. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1238 (cited in note 5). For an overview of the unauthorized practice
statutes, see Deborah L. Rhode, Poliingthe ProfessionalMonopoly: A Consiheional and EpVicial Analysis of
UnauthoritedPraiice
ProhiBiMons, 34 Stan L Rev 1, 3-44 (1981).
168. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1240 (cited in note 5); Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 271 (cited in
note 5).
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their own. 169 To protect the distinction between a business and a profession, the
bar made it taboo to seek to maximize profits through overtly commercial behavior or to serve the interests of business at the expense of the public good. 7 0
While not all of the legal elite joined in this view,' 7 ' most followed it in their
continuing commitment to the governing class role. Speaking for the legal elite,
the ABA made the commitment clear. The ABA Committee reporting on the
drafting of an ethics code stated that "[o]ur profession is necessarily the keystone of the republican arch of government. Weaken this keystone by allowing it
to be increasingly subject to the corroding and demoralizing influence of those
who are controlled by graft, greed and gain, or other unworthy motive, and
sooner or later the arch must fall.' 1 72 The drafters of the Canons of Ethics fur73
ther urged the ABA members to read and emulate Hoffman and Sharswood.
The 1908 Canons expressly endorsed the governing class role. 174 The Preamble stated that "[t]he future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon
[lawyers] maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained
unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such
as to merit the approval of all just men."5 In promoting the lawyer's public
duties, the Canons expressly rejected the hired gun role. Canon 15 denounced as
"a false claim, [the assertion] that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. ' 17 6 While quoting Sharswood's statement that "[t]he lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability,""1 77 Canon 15 concluded that a lawyer "must
obey his own conscience and not that of his client.' 78 Following client instructions was not an acceptable "excuse."'1 79 As Canon 31 stated, "[t]he responsibility for advising as to questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits,
for urging questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility." 8 0
Perhaps the most famous exemplar of the governing class ideology at that

169. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1238-40 (cited in note 5).
170. Id at 1242-44.
171.
For example, James B. Dill asserted that a "corporation lawyer was 'a businessman, specializing
along the lines of legal principles."' Haber, The.QuestforAuthorily and Honor in the American Professions at 235
(cited in note 9). This perspective led the rest of the elite to "cut [Dill] off" and refuse him "a position of
honor or authority in a professional association." Id.
172. Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 ABA Reports 600-01 (1906).
173. Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 243 & n 13 (cited in note 5).
174. Susan Carle has explained that the committee rejected an even stronger conception of the "duty
to do justice" that would probably have been closer to Hoffman's perspective. Susan D. Carle, Lanyers'
Duo to Dojusice:A New Look at the Histog of the 1908 Canons, 24 L & Soc Inquiry 1 (1999).
175. ABA Canons, Preamble (1908).

176.

ABA Canon 15.

177.
178.

Id. See Pearce, 6 Geo J Legal Ethics at 261 (cited in note 5).
ABA Canon 15.

179.

ABA Canon 31.

180.

Id.
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time was Louis D. Brandeis, corporate lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice.
Brandeis's vision illustrated how professionalism's conception of the governing
class resembled that of republicanism while diverging in some important respects. Like the republicans, Brandeis found lawyers particularly suited to their
responsibility as guardians of the rule of law and the common good. The study
of law "[led] to the development of judgment"' 81 and the practice of law made a
1' 83
lawyer "a good judge of men," 182 "judicial in attitude and extremely tolerant.
Indeed, the work of the business lawyer involved issues of "diplomacy" and
"statesmanship" of the highest order.18 4
Although offering a somewhat different formula than Sharswood for translating the governing class role into lawyer's work, Brandeis similarly identified
legislative and policy debates as requiring exclusive commitment to the common
good. 8 5 In the legislative arena, "the counsel selected to represent important
private interests possesses usually ability of a high order, while the public is often inadequately represented or wholly unrepresented." 186 As a consequence,
"[great unfairness to the public is apt to result" 18 7 The "great opportunity in
the law"' 188 was for a lawyer to act in the public arena as the "people's lawyer"
balancing the interests of "the wealthy and the people"'189 in favor of the common good.
Brandeis also factored the common good into courtroom representation,
but found that the fairness of the process permitted zealous client advocacy.
Brandeis urged the lawyer to represent the client "fairly and well"'190 because
"the lawyers on the two sides are usually reasonably well matched [and] the
judge or jury may ordinarily be trusted to make such a decision as justice demands."191

For Brandeis and other members of the legal elite, client counseling provided an important opportunity for promoting the common good. In one instance, Brandeis represented United Shoe in a dispute with its employees. 92
181. Brandeis, Businessat331 (cited in note 161).
182. Id at 332.
183. Id at 333. He commented that the lawyer's "profession rests upon the postulate that no contested question can be properly decided until both sides are heard. His experience teaches him that nearly
every question has two sides; and very often he finds---after decision of judge or jury-that both he and his
opponent were in the wrong." Id.
184. Id at 335. Brandeis noted that "[tihe relations between rival railroad systems are like the relations between neighboring kingdoms. The relations of the great trusts to the consumers or to their employees is like that of feudal lords to the commoners or dependents." Id.
185. Pearce, 6 GeoJ Legal Ethics at 254-55 (cited in note 5).
186. Brandeis, Bsinessat 340 (cited in note 161).

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id at 340
Idat 342.
Id at 337.
Id at 340.

191. Id.
192. Brandeis, Businessat 5-9 (cited in note 161); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Traditionin the Pracice of Law, 41 Vand L Rev 717,722 (1988).
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Brandeis investigated the employees' complaints that they needed annual, rather
than seasonal, employment. He determined that these claims were legitimate and
worked with his client to revamp the plants' manufacturing schedule in a manner Brandeis believed to be in the best interest of both his client and the employees. 93 Another way in which Brandeis incorporated the public good into
client representation was as a "counsel for the situation,"' 194 where Brandeis
would represent parties with actual or potential conflicting interests in an effort
to pursue a strategy which would best benefit all of them 95
Although critics in the bar agreed with Brandeis that lawyers should consider the common good in client counseling, they found lawyering for the situation to be unacceptable. At the confirmation hearings for Brandeis's appointment to the Supreme Court, bar leaders argued that Brandeis had acted unethically in representing conflicting interests. 196 For this and other perceived ethical
defects, ABA President Elihu Root strongly opposed the Brandeis nomination.197 Nonetheless, for Root, "law was not a business ....

[O]ne did not just

give the customer what he wanted, but what was needed." 98 While Root may
have believed that Brandeis strayed too far from client loyalty in seeking the
good of the situation, he urged corporate lawyers to resist financial temptation
and to maintain the disinterested independence of a proper governing class lawyer in urging clients to do what was right.199 Root maintained that "[a]bout half
the practice of a decent lawyer,. .. consists in telling would-be clients that they
200
are damned fools and should stop."
While this commitment to the common good united the perspectives of republicanism and professionalism, they emphasized different aspects of a disinterested commitment to the common good. Republicanism feared that the less
wealthy majority would encroach on the wealthy minority and underscored the
importance of protecting the rights of that minority. 20' In contrast, professionalism stressed "hold[ing] a position of independence, between the wealthy and the
people, prepared to curb the excess of either." 20 2 In the time of professionalism,
193. Brandeis, Business at 5-9 (cited in note 161).
194. Clyde Spillinger notes that although many commentators assert that Brandeis used this phrase
in testimony during "hearings on his nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court," the phrase was actually
attributed to Brandeis during the testimony of a former adversary, Sherman Whipple. Clyde Spillenger,
Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People'sLauyer, 105 Yale LJ 1445, 1504-05 (1996).
195. Id at 1502-11; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in The Practice ofLaw 58-61 (Yale 1978).
196. Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 71-72 (cited in note 8).
197. Id.
198. Haber, The Questfor Authori i and Honor in the American Professions at 225 (cited in note 9). Root
has claimed that "the lawyer's profession demands of him something more than the ordinary public duties
of citizenship. He has a duty to the law." Elihu Root, Some Duties of American Layers to American Law, 14
Yale LJ 63, 65 (1904).
199. Haber, The QuestforAuthorio,andHonor in the American Professions at 225 (cited in note 9).
200. Id.
201.
See text at notes 29-34.
202. Brandeis, Business at 337 (cited in note 161).
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this required redressing the "excess" power of big business. 2 3 Brandeis excoriated lawyers who failed their duty to the public good by "allow[ing] themselves

to become adjuncts of great corporations and... neglect[ing] the obligation to
use their powers for the protection of the people." 20 4
This exhortation illustrated another difference between professionalism and
republicanism. Republicanism was confident of lawyers' governing class role,
even in the face of public challenges. 205 In contrast, professionalism responded
to a concern that lawyers were not fulfilling their responsibilities to the public
good. From its inception, professionalism had to explain why some lawyers
failed to uphold their governing class responsibilities. Brandeis and other advocates of professionalism often found themselves in the position of criticizing the
conduct of lawyers of their time and urging a return to the higher standards of
the past 20 6 These pleas imparted a mixed message. They acknowledged both
lawyers' failings and lawyers' capacity to serve as a governing class capable of
promoting the public good.

C. PROFESSIONALISM ASCENDANT
Although these conflicting sentiments made professionalism a less stable
ideology than republicanism, it proved remarkably resilient and powerful. From
the late nineteenth century through the 1960s, professionalism provided the
legal elite with the basis for maintaining allegiance to the governing class role
and to the Business-Profession dichotomy upon which it relied.
Professionalism explained both why the legal elite deserved to be the governing class and why its financial success was legitimate. The classic account of
this view came from bar leader and former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe
Pound. According to Pound, the "primary purpose" of the lawyer's work was
the "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service." 20 7 Pound explained that "[g]aining a livelihood is incidental [to a profession], whereas in a
203. Id. For further discussion of the progressive approach to professionalism, see Luban, 41 Vand
L Rev at 723-26 (cited in note 192); William Simon, Babbitt v Brandeis: The Decline of the ProfessionalIdeal, 37
Stan L Rev 565, 565-71 (1985).
204. Brandeis, Business at 337 (cited in note 161). Brandeis exhorted the "American Bar. . to stand
again as it did in the past, ready to protect the interests of the people." Id at 337. He feared that "[t]here
will come a revolt of the people against the capitalists, unless the aspirations of the people are given some
adequate legal expression." Id at 339.
205. See Part LB.
206. Brandeis, Businessat 342 (cited in note 161) (acknowledging that the "bar does not now hold the
position which it formerly did as a brake upon democracy"). See also Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of
the Bar,48 Harv L Rev 1, 7-10 (1934) (beseeching lawyers to return to service as "guardian of public interests'); Rayman L Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in Robert L
Nelson, et al, eds, Lawjers' IdeaLs/Law)ers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession 152-53
(Cornell 1992) (describing numerous bar leaders who advocated professionalism and denounced "the
commercialization of practice").
207. Pound, The LawzerFromAntiqui_0to Modem Times at 5 (cited in note 105).
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business or trade it is the entire purpose. 208
This account, coupled with the invisible hand of reputation, explained how
the elite could be both financially prosperous and devoted to the public good.
As Pound noted, the elite did gain their livelihoods through their work as lawyers. But that was not their "primary purpose." They earned their livelihood by
pursuing achievement and service. The invisible hand of reputation ensured that
20 9
the most professional lawyers made the most money.
Rayman Solomon has documented how, despite periodic challenges to the
bar's governing class capacity, "the bar's understanding of the meaning and responsibilities of being a legal professional remained relatively unchanged" until
1960.210 When challenges to the bar's governing class capacity arose, professionalism provided a defense. For example, the perception that the "overcrowding"
of the bar during the Depression led to "excessive competition" and unethical
conduct 21' resulted in efforts to strengthen the bar and to tighten admission
requirements. 212 Even critics of the bar, such as Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, did
not suggest the abandonment of the governing class role. Stone believed that the
behavior of lawyers as business servants and profit maximizers contributed to
the occurrence of the Depression. 213 His response was to call for the bar to recommit itself to serving as "guardian of public interests" and to account for "the
way in which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a
214
whole."
A few critics did challenge fundamental aspects of the governing class role.
Karl Llewellyn, for example, asserted that lawyers were businessmen.215 He argued that as a general matter lawyers "working for business men toward business ends" have "a business point of view-toward the work to be done, toward
the value of the work to the community, indeed, toward the way in which to do
the work." 216 Another critic denied the lawyer's governing class responsibility
and asserted that the lawyer has "no other master" than the client.21 7 In Charles
Curtis's view, the lawyer's obligation was to dedicate his virtue to the client's
good and not to the public good. 218 The lawyer must "treat outsiders as if they

208.
209.
210.

Id.
Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1245 (cited in note 5).
Solomon, Five Crises or One at 168 (cited in note 206).

211.

Id at 156-57.

212.
213.
214.

Id at 158-59; Abel, American Lanyers at 7, 72 (cited in note 39).
Gordon, 68 BU L Rev at 3-4 (cited in note 15).
Stone, 38 Harv L Rev at 10 (cited in note 206).

215.

Id.

216.

Karl Llewelyn, The BarSpeaali.Zes-IWith Wlhat Results, 167 Annals 177, 177 (1933).

217.

Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocagy, 4 Stan L Rev 3, 3 (1951).

218. Id at 5-6. Curtis was equivocal with regard to lawyer's capacity for independent judgment. At
one point, he "doubted ... whether there is such a thing as intellectual impartiality, an equilibrium of
judgment." Id at 13. Later, he suggested that lawyers need to obtain some "detachment" from the client. Id
at 18-23.
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were barbarians and enemies. '219 Curtis went so far as to assert "that one of the
functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client" 220 While lying to the court was not
permissible, Curtis believed that it was permissible to mislead the court. 221
In preserving their loyalty to the governing class perspective, the bar elite effectively ignored these challenges. In 1958, the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools issued a report on the lawyer's role.22 The Report expressly
stated that "[t]he lawyer's role imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of
those fundamental processes of government and self-government upon which
the successful functioning of our society depends." 223 Like Brandeis and his
republican forebears, the Report extended this obligation to law reform, government service, and private practice. 224 As the Report noted, "[p]rivate practice
is a form of public service when it is conducted with appreciation of, and a respect for, the larger framework of government of which it forms a part, including under the term government... voluntary forms of self-regulation.22 5 As the
"natural architect" of "the great bulk of human relations, '226 the lawyer as counselor must "preserve a sufficient detachment from his client's interests so that
he remains capable of a sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what
his client proposes to do." 227 Even while serving as an advocate, the lawyer's
"zeal [should] promotea a wise and informed decision of the case[ and not]
muddy the headwaters [and] distort[ and obscure [the] true nature" of the "controversy."m
In the early 1960s, Erwin Smigel's landmark study of Wall Street lawyers
confirmed the view of the legal elite as America's governing class. Beginning in
the late 1950s, Smigel undertook to study the "large law firm in American society,"2 29 including in his research interviews of a "representative" sample230 of
188 lawyers of the "approximately 1700"231 in eighteen of the twenty large New
York firms. 232 Based on his study of how these lawyers described themselves,
Smigel concluded that the legal elite fit Tocqueville's description of "the lawyer

219. Id at 5.
220. Id at 9.
221. Id at 9-10.
222. ProfessionalReponsibility:Reportof the Joint Conference, 44 ABA J 1159, 1159 (Dec 1958).
223. Idat 1162.
224. Id at 1162, 1217-18. This role included shaping the public's perceptions of the justice system. Id
at 1162, 1216.
225. Id at 1162.
226. Idat 1161.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawjer at 1(cited in note 1) (capitalization omitted).
230. Id at 31.
231. Id.
232. Id at 29.
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in America as the aristocracy of this country." 233 They served as "spokesm[e]n
for big business," 234 leaders of government, 235 molders of international relations,236 and pillars of "charit[able] and cultural affairs. '237 While promoting the
interests of business clients, the legal elite protected the public good by serving
as a "buffer between the illegitimate desires of ... clients and the social interest.''238 Their independence derived from two sources. First, "they . . . 'represent' the law and must therefore separate themselves from the client." 239 Second,
the commodity they sold was "[i]ndependent legal opinion." 24° Smigel observed
that "client[s] desire that a firm maintain its autonomy" so that they can obtain
the best advice. 241 Moreover, as the large firms grew older, they increased their
number of clients and moved away from fundamentally relying on one or a few
clients. 242 This shift "strengthened... a firm's ability to retain its independence"
because "no one client provid[es] enough income to materially or consciously
'243
influence the law office's legal opinion.
Smigel observed that the governing class role pervaded the work of elite
lawyers. He found that working in the "public interest," 244 elite lawyers
"serve ... as the conscience of big business." 245 They brought to their role their
"duty to society" and "many relevant social, economic and philosophic considerations," as well their capacity to "predict n legal consequences." 246 Elite lawyers
advised their clients "upon not only what is permissible but also what is desirable." 247 Smigel noted that "[l]awyers often use their positions as advisors to
guide their clients into what they believe to be proper and moral legal posi249
tions." 248 They served this role in transactions and in litigation.
The elite lawyer's shaping of corporate conduct had important conse233.

Id at 12. The Wall Street lawyers were among "only a handful of lawyers [who] fit this descrip-

tion." Id.
234.
235.
236.

Id at 4 (italics and capitalization omitted).
Id at 8-10.
Id at 11-12.

237.

Id at 10-11.

238. Id at 342, quoting Talcott Parsons, The Law and Sodal Control, in William M. Evan, ed, Law and
Sociology 69 (Free Press 1962).
239. Id at 344.
240. Id at 343.
241. Id.
242. Id at 344.
243. Id.
244. Id at 6 (quoting Justice Charles Edward Wyzanksi, Jr.).
245. Id at 5 (joining in Martin Mayer's observation).
246. Id at 6 (quoting Justice Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr.).
247. Id at 5-6 (quoting Justice Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr.). Smigel noted that "[t]he lawyer.., as
the conscience of the businessman is saying: 'So far as the law goes, you can do this-but you must not."'

Id.
248. Id. For example, the process of drafting an "opinion letter.., in itself tends to induce the client
to take conservative business positions and perhaps increase his economic conscience in terms of a broader
distribution of profits." Id.

249.

Id at 6-8.
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quences for social stability. Like Brandeis, Smigel found that elite lawyers "give
our society continuity."250 Applying "cautious use of societal brakes, 251 they
"provide[ the liberal with time and opportunity to seek change in a relatively
stable society" and thwart "[t]he revolutionary" by "not allow[ing] the seeds of
deep discontent to flower." 25 2 No wonder Smigel concluded that "[t]he important role [elite lawyers] play in our society makes what happens to them of gen25 3
eral concem."

M. Tim COLLAPSE OF TmE GOVERNING CLASS IDEA
In the years following publication of Smigel's book, the governing class idea
lost its vitality. While it still retained the lip service of bar leaders, it no longer
influenced how the legal elite viewed their role. In contrast to the late nineteenth
century, when the elite coupled their fears of the decline of the legal profession
with a new formula for preserving the Business-Profession dichotomy, the
twentieth-century elite fixated on the decline and unsuccessfully demanded adherence to professionalism. In explaining the demise of the governing class conception, leaders of the profession relied on changes in the legal services market,
bar rules, legal education, and the diversity of the legal profession. This article
instead suggests that other factors were more significant. Two were societal
factors-the loss of faith in elites and the shift from communitarianism to individualism. Two related specifically to lawyers-the development of a public
interest bar and of the idea of a pro bono duty.
A. FROM GOVERNING CLASS TO HIRED GUN
In 1985, contributors to a landmark Stanford Law Review Symposium on the
Corporate Law Firm,254 found elite lawyers serving a very different role than that
identified by Smigel. Writing in this symposium, Deborah Rhode noted that the
rhetoric that law practice was public service "appears increasingly removed from
the enterprise it purports to describe."255 Elite lawyers had abandoned the governing class ideal in favor of Lord Brougham's adversarial model. Two papers,
in particular, offered evidence to support this conclusion.
Robert L. Nelson expressly contradicted Smigel's conception of the governing class elite lawyer. 25 6 Rather than "play a mediating role with respect to client
250.

Id at 342.

251. Id. One illustration of this dynamic is Smigel's observation that "the lawyer tells his client there
is no law preventing a certain behavior, nevertheless, if he does 'such-and-such,' his action will ensure that
the law is enacted." Id at 6.

252.

Id at 342.

253.

Id at 13-14.

254.

See note 3.

255.
256.

Deborah Rhode, EthicalPerpect'verin LgalPracdel, 37 Stan L Rev 589, 592 (1985).
Nelson, 37 Stan L Rev 503 (cited in note 4). Nelson interviewed 224 lawyers at four elite Chi-
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demands," Nelson concluded that lawyers "are more likely to press for the
' z57
maximum advantage of their clients in order to attract future business."
Where Smigel found that elite lawyers, while sharing many values with their
clients, maintained an independent perspective on the public good, Nelson concluded that elite lawyers "show such a strong identification with the interests of
clients . . . that it is unrealistic to think of corporate lawyers as neutral professionals who are detached from the substantive interests of their cients."2 8
While "[m]ore than three-quarters of the sample [of elite Chicago lawyers]
responded that it was appropriate to act as the conscience of a client when the
opportunity presented itself, ' 25 9 they also reported that they did not do so. At
most, only 2.4% of the lawyers related giving advice regarding the "public interest." 260 Three-quarters of the sample also reported that they had not had a serious conflict with a client during their entire career. 261 Based on his data, Nelson
concluded that "[t]he notion that lawyers struggle with clients over fundamental
questions of the common good is simply wrong." 262 Instead, he found that they
served as hired guns for their clients. Nelson observed that "in general, largefirm lawyers strive to maximize the substantive interests of their clients within
263
the boundaries of legal ethics."
Robert Kagan and Robert Eli Rosen reached a similar conclusion. 264 They
reported on the responses of a "non-random sample" of fourteen partner and
six associate acquaintances. 265 They found that "the experience of our small
cadre of corporate lawyer respondents is that the influential and independent
counselor role is now an exceptional rather than a common aspect of large firm
practice." 266 Clients did not want lawyers to fulfill this role267 and lawyers did not
cago law firms. Id at 509. He sought to explore "two themes .... First, to what extent are lawyers in large
firms merely the instruments of their clients, and to what extent do they attempt to modify the clients'
behavior. Second, what impact does the advice and advocacy of the large firm have on society's allocation
of scarce resources." Id at 511.
257. Id at 544.
258. Id at 526-27. See also Glendon, A Nation Under Lanyers at 75 (cited in note 5) (relying on Nelson's findings). Nelson's conclusions accorded with those of Edward 0. Laumann and John P. Heinz who
found, a few years earlier than Nelson, that elite Chicago lawyers were more subject to client control than
non-elite lawyers. Heinz and Laumann, ChicagoLaners (cited in note 8).
259. Nelson, 37 Stan L Rev at 532 (cited in note 4).
260. Id at 533.
261. Id at 536. See also Glendon, A Nation UnderLawjers at 75 (cited in note 5) (relying on this finding as reported in Nelson's book based on this study). One lawyer observed that "[mjy work [big case
litigation] doesn't raise questions of conscience, it's just a fight over which big corporation is going to get a
bigger chunk of the pie." Nelson, 37 Stan L Rev at 537 (cited in note 4).
262. Nelson, 37 Stan L Rev at 538 (cited in note 4).
263. Id. For example, one firm partner reported that when an associate told him that "'the only
difference between us and the small-time crook and dirty litigator is that they try and do the same thing by
dishonesty that we try and do by cleverness,' [he] had to agree with him." Id at 538 n 69.
264. Kagan and Rosen, 37 Stan L Rev at 399 (cited in note 4).
265. Id at 431.
266. Id at 435.
267. Id at 423-27, 439.
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believe the role to be appropriate2 68 In effect, elite lawyers had become hired
guns subject to client control and having no responsibility for the public
good.2 69 Only one of the twenty lawyers surveyed disagreed with this characterization.270
Other commentators confirmed this shift in perception. While acknowledging that some lawyers continued to employ the rhetoric of the governing class
vision, 271 they described Lord Brougham's hired gun as the "dominant 272 conception of the lawyer's role. 273 Whether they favored 274 this approach or opposed it,27 commentators agreed that most lawyers understood themselves this
way. 276 Murray Schwartz, and later David Luban, described this "standard conception of the lawyer's role" as having two basic principles. 277 First, the "partisanship principle" provided that, within the bounds of the law, the lawyer must
act as an extreme partisan on the client's behalf.278 Second, the "nonaccountability principle" provided that the lawyer was not morally accountable for her conduct so long as she was acting as the client's partisan.279 Luban concluded that
although other conceptions of the lawyer's role existed, "[t]he true haven of the
standard conception ... is large-firm practice."2 8 0

In becoming hired guns, elite lawyers abandoned the traditional governing
268. Id at 435 (noting that "contemporary corporate lawyers often seem to reject even the aspiration
to serve as molders of corporate and public policy"). One partner wrote that "[c]orporate executives are
supposed to make decisions, not lawyers .... Lawyers acting in a legal capacity should, it seems to me, be
making evaluations without business responsibility." Id.
269. Id at 436 (asserting that elite lawyers "enshrine[d] client control while abdicating responsibility
for the social and economic impact of his client's actions (and of his own actions in carrying out his client's
decisions)'). In direct contrast to Smigel's lawyers of an earlier generation, those that Kagan and Rosen
studied advised only regarding "legal consequences, and not upon .. . autonomous evaluation of social
consequences, political wisdom, or good business practices." Id at 436-37.
270. Id at 431. Nonetheless, many were proud of incidents where they "had 'done the world some
good."' Id at 432.
271. See, for example, Rhode, 37 Stan L Rev at 592 (cited in note 255). Accordingly, Charles Wolfram described the hired gun conception as the "dominant, although hardly universal, professional ethic."
Charles Wolfram, Modem LegalEthics580 (West 1986).
272. Wolfram, Modem LegalEthics at 580 (cited in note 271).
273. See note 125 and accompanying text.
274. See, for example, Freedman, UnderstandingLayers' Ethics (cited in note 5); Stephen L. Pepper,
The Law'er'sAmoral EthicalRole:A De.fense, A Probkm, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am Bar Found Research J
613.
275. See, for example, David Luban, Lawyers andjustice:An EthicalStudy xx (Princeton 1988); Rhode,
37 Stan L Rev at 594 (cited in note 255).
276. Richard Abel observed that "[lgawyers are hired guns: they know they are, their clients demand
that they be, and the public sees them that way." Abel, American Lawyers at 247 (cited in note 39). But see
Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy'sStandard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis L Rev 1529 (asserting that
lawyers have a more pluralistic understanding of their rule which includes governing class values).
277. Luban, Lawgers andJusticexx, 10 (cited in note 275); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalismand
Acronntabilib,ofLayers, 66 Cal L Rev 669, 671-73 (1978).
278. Luban, Lawyers andJusticeat xx, 10 (cited in note 275).
279. Id. See also Rhode, 37 Stan L Rev at 602 (cited in note 255).
280. David Luban, Partisansho,Betrayal, andAutonomr in the Law'er-ClientRelationsh:A Rep/y to Stephen
Ellmann, 90 Colum L Rev 1004, 1016 (1990).
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class ideology. They were no longer acting as a disinterested political leadership
capable of discerning and pursuing the common good.281 Instead, they were
advocates of pivate interests. They had violated professionalism's taboo on acting
as a servant of big business and could no longer claim the special tie to the pub282
lic good which distinguished them from those in business.
Although the legal elite's consensus on the governing class role had evaporated, lawyers continued to debate the connection between their work and the
public good. Many sought to revive the governing class ideal through public
admonishments and educational programs aimed at reviving commitment to
professionalism. Some asserted very thin conceptions of the governing class
based on the hired gun role. Under these approaches, lawyers served as the governing class in their capacity as advocates of private interests in an adversarial
system which itself determined the public good.283 Others proposed commitments to the common good independent of the Business-Profession dichotomy.
Some of these commentators asserted that lawyers' obligation to the common
good was the same as that of all other people and that the importance of lawyers' work to the governance of society made them a public-interested governing class. 284 Whether a new consensus would emerge, and the direction it would
take, was far from clear.
B. THE BAR'S EXPLANATIONS FOR THE COLLAPSE
Leaders of the bench and bar agreed that professionalism had failed to preserve the distinction between a business and a profession. In 1984, Chief Justice
Burger observed that "the standards and traditions of the bar" no longer "restrain[ed] members of the profession from practices and customs common and
acceptable in the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace. '285 Commentators described the fate of professionalism using "apocalyptic" language. 286 As I have
noted elsewhere, they "asserted that lawyers, their ethics, and their professionalism were 'lost,' 'betrayed,' in 'decline,' in 'crisis,' facing 'demise,' near 'death,' and
in need of 'redemption."' 287 In the words of one bar leader, "the legal profession
is 'on the way into a black hole of pure commercialism from which there is no
281.

See Parts I and II.

282.

Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1243-44, 1253-54 (cited in note 5).

283.

See Rhode, 37 Stan L Rev at 594-617 (cited in note 255) (describing and questioning such ar-

guments).

284.

See, for example, Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1262-63, 1265-76 (cited in note 5); Thomas L

Shaffer, LazgerProfessionalismas MoralArgument,26 Gonzaga L Rev 393, 403-04 (1990-91).

285.

Warren E. Burger, The State of Juslice, 70 ABA J 62, 63 (Apr 1984). Burger noted that

"[hlistorically, honorable lawyers complied with traditions of the bar and refrained from doing all that the

laws or the Constitution allowed them to do. Specifically, they did not advertise, they did not solicit...
they considered our profession as one dedicated to public service." Id.

286. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1257 (cited in note 5) (listing the various terms used to describe the
fate of the profession).
287. Id (footnotes omitted).
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retun.)"288

The behavior of law firms appeared to resemble the behavior of other businesses. The New York Times observed that "anew era had dawned, one in which
the practice of law has ceased to be a gentlemanly profession and instead has
become an extremely competitive business."2 9 Law firms devised entrepreneurial strategies for marketing their services and "hawked their wares" to the public.2 90 Compensation plans rewarded lawyers for the profits they generated, not
their professional contribution, and dissuaded lawyers from public service. 291 To
pursue their business goals, law firms adopted "the forms of businesses. They
added managers, business plans, marketing directors, and financially driven

292
strategies to maximize efficiency in making profits."
Commentators have attributed the hired gun behavior described above to
elite lawyers' pursuit of financial self-interest, which caused them to promote
private interests at the expense of the public good. When a client asked for advice, the lawyer explained how to maximize material self-interest and ignored
the public good because advising clients to avoid "antisocial" conduct would
undermine "the marketing program." 293 Commentators also noted that quite a
few elite lawyers went beyond the bounds of the law in promoting their clients'
financial interests and that some of them were implicated in well-publicized
294
scandals.
These commentators have offered a variety of explanations for why so
many elite lawyers have abandoned commitment to the common good. Some
attributed this transformation to changes in the demand side of the market for
legal services. The growth of in-house counsel and the related decision of large

corporate clients to shift from employing a single firm to a multiplicity of firms
both caused the firms to compete for business and undermined the long-term
relationship of mutual trust between lawyer and client that made it possible to
counsel effectively on the public's interests.2 95 Other factors "unleash[mg] the
entrepreneurial inclinations of American lawyers" included "[t]he deregulation
of finance and business, the internationalization of economic exchange, [and]
288. Id (quoting "[a] president of the Colorado Bar").
289. Tamar Lewin, A Gentlemanly Profession Entersa Tomgh New Era,NY Times, §3 at (Jan 16, 1983).
290. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1253 (cited in note 5).
291. Id at 1251-53.
292. Id at 1252.
293. Sol M. Linowitz and Martin Mayer, The Betrged Profession:Lawyedng at the End of the Twentieth Century 4 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1994). These authors also note that "[n]obody ever lost a client by doing
exactly what the fellow wanted, but much lucrative legal work has been sacrificed by lawyers who regretfully told prospective clients that this was something they were not willing to do." Id at 18-19.
294. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1254 (cited in note 5).
295. Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, The Tran~rormadionof the Big Law Firm,in Robert L.Nelson, et
al, eds, Lawjer' IdealslLawers' Practices: Transformationsin the American Legal Profession 48 (Cornell 1992);
American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Senice: A Blueprintfor the
Rekindling of La.)er Professionalism 9 (American Bar Association 1986); Glendon, A Nation Under Lazyers at
34 (cited in note 5); Linowitz and Mayer, The Betra'edProfessionat 38-39 (cited in note 293).
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'296
the rise of litigation among corporate actors.
Commentators have also cited changes in the regulation of lawyer marketing
as a contributing factor. According to this view, the Bates decision prohibiting
bans on lawyer advertising released the constraints on entrepreneurial behavior.
One bar leader complained that "[w]e now condone advertising and solicitation
of clients, activities that were formerly unethical and unprofessional. '297 Another
observed that "[m]uch of the perceived commercialism of the legal profession
298
has been directly attributed to attorney advertising."
Another contributing factor was the shifting culture of the bar. Commentators have suggested that in the past the relatively homogenous bar leadership of
predominantly white, Protestant, and male lawyers had sustained an ethos of
noblesse oblige professionalism. Jewish elite lawyer Sol Linowitz observed that "the
socialization of the bar was that of an all-male, all-white, mostly Protestant
club.... The maintenance of camaraderie when the comrades encompass a
wider variety of mankind is more difficult." 299 Timothy Terrell and James Wildman similarly noted that the shift from a "close-knit community of colleagues"
to a diverse bar has caused "[w]hat was understood or assumed concerning appropriate behavior" to degenerate into "standards that ... are vague, lack serious moral force, and are constantly being challenged or rethought."3''
In addition to diversity, commentators ascribed increased disregard for the
common good by lawyers to changes in legal education. Sol Linowitz blamed
law schools for teaching "that ethical behavior is far less important than political
belief" 301 and for "fail[ing] to relate law school education to any aspect of practice." 302 Anthony Kronman faulted the influence of the "law and economics"
and "critical legal studies" movements for promoting a scientific approach to
law that disdained the virtue of practical wisdom necessary to the lawyer303
statesman ideal.
While these analyses have captured the imagination of the bar's elite, they
fail to prove a causal link between their claims and the changed perception of
the lawyer's role. Similar behavior occurred in the past without rejection of the

296. Robert L. Nelson and David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Le-gaI
Profession, in Robert L. Nelson, et al, eds, Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformationsin the American Legal
Profession 1, 13 (Cornell 1992).
297. John J. Yanas, The President'sMessage, 62 NY St B J 3,3 (May 1990).
298. Edward D. Re, The Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 St John's L Rev 85, 98
(1994).
299. Linowitz and Mayer, The Betrayed Profession at 56 (cited in note 293).
300. Timothy P. Terrell and James H. Wildman, Retbinking 'Professionalist," 41 Emory L J 403, 412
(1992). Anthony Kronman concluded that "[a]s membership of these firms has become more diverse, the
loose consensus that once existed among the lawyers working in them regarding the most appropriate
patterns for living has begun to fray and, in certain respects, has broken down completely." Kronman, The
Lost Lawyer at 293 (cited in note 5).
301. Linowitz and Mayer, The Betrayed Profession at 119 (cited in note 293).

302.

Id at 125.

303.

Kronman, The Lost Lawyer at 166-67 (cited in note 5).
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Business-Profession dichotomy. Elite lawyers had historically made a lot of
money and considered themselves servants of the public good. They explained
their large profits not as the rewards of business conduct but as "incidental" to
their professionalism and the deserved reward of the invisible hand of reputation.304 Elite lawyers also had openly marketed their services. David Hoffman,
whose early work helped define the governing class role, placed advertisements
in the NaionalIntelligencer,which boasted a testimonial from John Marshall, then
the sitting Chief Justice of the United States 30 5
The Business-Profession dichotomy also survived previous changes in the
market for legal services. The shifts in demand, such as the growth of in-house
counsel and the diversification of outside counsel, began before the demise of
the governing class ideal. Indeed, Erwin Smigel credited these developments
with strengthening the elite lawyer's ability to provide independent counsel to
corporations. 30 6 Even when elite lawyers developed entrepreneurial strategies to
take advantage of changes in the legal services market in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, 30 7 the Business-Profession dichotomy continued to
command the elite's allegiance. Many of those who helped create and promote
the ideology of professionalism also built the modem corporate law firms, or
"law factories," to better serve the needs of newly emergent big business interests.308 In regard to lawyers' business behavior, what appears most different at
the end of the twentieth century is not the type of changes or kinds of conduct,
but the elite's perception of that conduct.
Also unconvincing are the explanations drawing on law school training.
Elite law school training has never been practice-oriented. 309 This is not a new
phenomenon. Similarly, as Kronman concedes, the scientific approach to legal
education is not new to law and economics or to critical legal studies. Langdell's
scientific approach has dominated law teaching for more than a century, such
that even its critics generally adopt its disdain for teaching virtue 3 10 Kronman
304.
305.

Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1245 (cited in note 5).
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al, WLy Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analsis of

LegalSenices, 58 NYU LRev 1084, 1085 n 2 (1985).
306. Smigel, The WallStreetLawzerat 344 (cited in note 1).
307. Elite law firms moved to adopt the "Cravath system" of specialization and teamwork in creating
the framework for the modem large law firm. Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 23-25 (cited in note 8).
308. See Part II.

309.

The premise of elite legal education was that the student could not properly learn how to be a

lawyer through practice as the apprenticeship system promised. Robert Stevens, Law Schook Legal Education
in Amerkcafrom the 1850s to the 1980s 17-23, 112 (North Carolina 1983); Haber, Authority and Honor in the
Amesican Professionsat 221-22 (cited in note 9). Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century and the
early twentieth century, elite institutions excluded practical training from the curriculum. Alfred Z. Reed,

Trainingfor the Public Profession of the Law: HistoricalDevelopment and Pincial Contempora~y Prohlms of Legal
Education in the United States with Some Account of Conditions in Englandand Canada260, 284, 378-439 (Camegie
Foundation Bulletin 1921). Not surprisingly, tensions arose between legal academics who preferred theoretical approaches to the study of law and practitioners who favored more vocational training. Id at 260;
Auerbach, UnequalJusticeat 84-94, 166-67 (cited in note 8).
310. Kronman, The Last Lawyer at 210 (cited in note 5); Russell Pearce, Teaching Ethics Sedousjy: Legal
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acknowledges that his model teacher of practical wisdom, Karl Llewellyn, was a
supremely talented but isolated thinker who had no followers in the conventional sense" and who did not develop "an organized school of thought." 31
Similarly, the explanations based on diversity are not persuasive. While the
idea that the homogeneity of the elite correlates with the ease of maintaining a
consensus is appealing, 31 2 the historical record reveals that the BusinessProfession dichotomy survived two major increases in the diversity of the profession. In the early nineteenth century, unprecedented numbers of working and
middle-income men joined a profession that had previously been an upper class
preserve. 313 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, large numbers
of white Catholic and Jewish men entered a largely white Protestant male legal
establishment.314 While both of these periods coincided with challenges to the
legal elite, 315 the Business-Profession dichotomy survived.
Moreover, the alleged threat of increased diversity of the legal profession
appears highly exaggerated. Among the elite, the increase has been quite limited.
As Deborah Rhode notes in a book published only one year ago: "Women and
minorities remain overrepresented at the bottom and underrepresented at the
top of professional status and reward structures." 316 Moreover, individuals from
underrepresented groups have often demonstrated a commitment to the public
good.317 For example, Thurgood Marshall, an African American who was one of
the most influential lawyers of the twentieth century, devoted his career as a
31 8
public interest lawyer, government servant, and judge to the pursuit of justice.
Ethics as the Most Important Course in Law School, 29 Loy U Chi LJ 719, 728-32 (1998).
311. Kronman, The Lost Lanyer at 210 (cited in note 5).
312. See, for example, Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer at 252 (cited in note 1).
313. See, for example, Gary Nash, The PhiladelphiaBench andBar, 1800-1861, 7 Comp Stud Soc & Hist
203 (1965) (describing increased class diversity in the Philadelphia Bar).
314. See Abel, American Lawyers at 85-87 (cited in note 39).
315. See, for example, Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism 185-86 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1976) (as the states removed barriers to entry into legal practice, "[tihe homogeneity of the older elite
group dissolved as white, Protestant, middle-class sons from families of small businessmen, clerks, tradesmen, and artisans began entering the profession in significant numbers"); Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 50
(cited in note 8) (suggesting that "[tihe ethical crusade that produced the Canons concealed class and ethnic
hostility" toward Jewish and Catholic lawyers).
316. Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests ofJustice 38-39 (Oxford 2000).
317. Numerous articles and essays describe women and African-American lawyers with strong commitments to the common good. See, for example, Judith Kilpatrick, (Extra)OrdinagyMen: African-American
Lauere and Civil Rights in Arkansas Before 1950, 53 Ark L Rev 299 (2000); Paul Finkelman, Not On# the
Judges' Robes Were Black: Afuican-American Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 Stan L Rev 161 (1994), reviewing J.
Clay Smith, Jr., Emandpation: The Making of the Black Lauyer, 1844-1944 (Pennsylvania 1993); Steven H.
Hobbs, From the Shoulders of Hoeston. A Visionfor Social and EconomicJustice, 32 How LJ 505 (1989); J. Clay
Smith, Black Women Lawyers: 125 Years at the Bar- 100 Years in the Legal Academy, 40 How L J 365 (1997);
Richard F. Harem, Mobiliting Legal Talentfor a Cause: The National Woman's Party andthe Campaign to MakeJuy
Servicefor Women a FederalRight, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 97 (2001); Martha F. Davis, Our Better Half.
A PublicInterest Lawyer Reflects on Pro Bono Layering and Social Change Litigation, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol &
L 119 (2001).

318.

See, for example, James M. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lager-Statesmen, 103 Yale L J 1031,
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At best, therefore, arguments based on the market for legal services, bar
rules, legal education, and diversity are not dispositive.319 Perhaps future analysis
will reveal that these changes were so different in character and influence than
past events that they indeed caused the demise of the governing class role. Absent such evidence, however, they appear more likely to be symptoms and not
causes.
C. WHY THE GOVERNING CLASS IDEOLOGY COLLAPSED
This section proposes a different account of the decline of the governing
class conception. It suggests that four related factors are responsible for this
shift: @ growing distrust of disinterested expertise, () a surge in individualism,
(iii) emergence of the public interest bar, and (iv) the development of a pro
bono ethical duty. While this article's analysis of these factors is preliminary,
they appear to offer a far more satisfactory explanation of the transformation of
the legal elite's self-image.
1. The Egalitarian Anti-Expert Impulse
The democratic and egalitarian influence emanating from the 1960s rejected
both the need, and rationale, for lawyers' governing class role. The very existence of a governing class was anathema to a democratic and egalitarian perspective. As Louis Menand notes, "disillusionment about professionalism [repre321
sents] a democratic upsurge. 320 Beyond "[q]uestioning authority" itself, contemporary culture rejected the belief that lawyers had a special capability for
perceiving and pursuing the common good that justified the governing class
role.3z2 It considered claims of disinterestedness and "expertise [to be] an ine1071 n 173 (1994) (describing Marshall as an "exemplar of the lawyer-statesman ideal"), discussing Kronman, The Lost L=v)yer (cited in note 5); Robert W. Gordon, Is Law Still a Profession? Was It Ever One? And
Does It Matter? 23 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that Marshall, along with two
other outsiders, did "more to live out [professional] values than anyone in the blue-chip firms"); Denis F.
McLaughlin, Address to the Class of 1996: On Becoming a Lanyer, 26 Seton Hall L Rev 505, 510 (1996) (urging
incoming law students to emulate Thurgood Marshall); Jon M. Sands and Jane L. McClellan, Book Review:
Juan Williams, Thuqgood Marshalk American Revolutionagy, 23 Champion 83, 83 (1999) (describing Marshall as
"the greatest lawyer in the twentieth century").
319. Another set of commentators have argued that, in the late twentieth century, lawyers' pursuit of
judicially activist solutions to social problems undermined the public's trust in lawyers' function as the
governing class. Glendon, A Nation Under Lanyers at 1-7 (cited in note 5); Paul Carrington, Stewards of
Democrag 5 (Westview 1999); Hazard, 100 Yale LJ at 1278 (cited in note 120). This article, however, focuses on how elite lawyers perceive themselves and not on how others perceive them. Nonetheless, this
argument also appears questionable in light of historical precedent. During the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt, for example, elite lawyers promoted judicial activism as part of their attack on the New Deal.
Auerbach, UnequalJusticeat 192-95 (cited in note 8); Solomon, Five Crises
or One at 160 (cited in note 206).
320. Louis Menand, The Thrashingof Professionalism,NY Times Magazine 41 (Mar 5, 1995).
321. Id.
322. See also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneu-
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galitarian sham." 323 The late twentieth-century view was "that disinterestedness
itself is a myth, the beard behind which elites conceal their contempt for the
324
people. Everyone is now understood to be self-interested."
Although the legal elite rejected similar arguments in the nineteenth century,
it appears to have accepted them in the late twentieth century. 325 The acceptance
of this view changed the very nature of the dialogue on challenges to the Business-Profession dichotomy. In the past, leaders of the elite sought to correct the
neglect of the public good by admonishing their colleagues for failing to be "as
disinterested as they ought to be" 326 and appealing to them to return to the governing class ideal. 327 These entreaties had little impact on lawyers who understood themselves to be self-interested. They were more comfortable with the
role of hired gun. It provided them with a rationale for pursuing their own selfinterest and for pursuing the self-interest of their clients.
2. The Decline of Communitarianism and Rise of Individualism
The large firm lawyer was not alone in losing sight of his responsibilities to
the larger community. Commentators have noted the increased individualism
characterizing American society since the 1960s. Some commentators have described this shift away from communal responsibility as the acceleration of an
existing trend. 328 For example, Robert H. Wiebe observes that the individualistic
and majoritarian impulses of American democracy "separated around 1920" and
were "at war" by the 1960s.329 Others describe the shift as a reversal of a twentieth-century trend toward community engagement. 330 According to Robert Putnam, since the 1960s "we have been pulled apart from one another and from

rial Government,75 NYU L Rev 1121, 1196 (noting that "Americans are much more skeptical of claims that
professionals deserve autonomy because of their specialized knowledge and ethos").
323. Menand, NY Times Magazine at 41 (cited in note 320).
324. Id. See Charles Derber, et al, Powerin the Highest Degree: Professionals and the Rise of a New Mandain
Order225 (Oxford 1990) (noting that "[a] new generation of sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s broke with
Parsons and asserted that professionals' claims about their altruism and abilities were ruses to consolidate
power and evade public accountability").
325. This is especially true of lawyers entering the profession after the 1960s. Menand, NY Times
Magazine at 43 (cited in note 320) (observing that "[n]o one feels [this skepticism] more keenly than the
newly minted professional, who knows perfectly well how much his or her desire to become.., a lawyer
was motivated by disinterested devotion to 'the law' and how much by a panicky desire to be financially
secure in insecure times').
326. Id.
327. Pearce, 70 NYU L Rev at 1244 (cited in note 5). See also note 206 and accompanying text.
328. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk" The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse (Free Press 1991); Robert
H. Wiebe, Self-Rule:A CulturalHistory ofAmerican Democray (Chicago 1995).
329. Wiebe, Self-Rule at 223 (cited in note 328).
330. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican Community 27 (Simon & Schuster 2000). See also Robert N. Bellah, et al, Habits of theHeart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life
(California updated ed 1996).
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our communities. 331 Putnam cites "sharp, steady declines in club meetings,
visits with friends, committee service, church attendance, philanthropic generos-

ity, card games, and electoral turnout" as indicators of the decline in civic engagement 332 Similarly, Robert N. Beliah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan
and Steven Tipton find that "[a]mong [the knowledge and power] elite the crisis
of civic membership is expressed in the loss of civic consciousness, of a sense of
333
obligation to the rest of society."
As communal obligations collapsed, so did the governing class ideal premised on lawyers' commitment to the common good. Reflecting the perspective
of their fellow Americans, lawyers now defined themselves less as responsible
members of a larger society and more as individuals seeking self-fulfillment. For
the first time, the balance between public good and client advocacy shifted almost entirely to the client.3M The hired gun's devotion to vindicating the particular interests of the individual client-whether a person or a corporate entity-comported perfectly with the dominant ethos of individualism.
3. The Development of the Public Interest Bar
Although the governing class conception relied on the elite to protect the
public interest, a new segment of the bar emerged in the 1960s to claim that role

and redefine the public good. Building on the models of the small groups of
lawyers who had dedicated themselves to the NAACP and the ACLU beginning

early in the twentieth century,335 the "new public interest lawyer[s]" 336 comprised
a "large and diverse group of practitioners engaged in a broad range of activi-

ties" 337 based in newly created legal services offices, legal defense funds, and
advocacy groups which promoted interests "underrepresent[ed] in the legalpolitical process." 338 In contrast to the governing class understanding of the

common good as balancing competing interests in society,339 public interest
lawyers followed the model of the NAACP's Charles Hamilton Houston and
Thurgood Marshall in identifying themselves as advocates promoting particular
visions of social justice.34 Public interest lawyers engaged in "aiding the poor;
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Putnam, BowlingAlone at 27 (cited in note 330).
Id at 185. See also Bellah, Habits of the Heartat xvi (cited in note 330).
Bellah, Habits of the Heartat xii (cited in note 330).
See Part Il.A.
See, for example, Martha Davis, Brutal Need-Lanyers and the Wefay Rights Movement, 1960-1973

29 (Yale 1993).

336.
(1970).

Robert Borosage, et al, Research Project, The New Public Interest Lazayers, 79 Yale L J 1069, 1145

337. Id.
338.
339.

Id at 1072.
See notes 184-88, 202 and accompanying text.

340.

Howard Ball, A DefiantLife: ThurgoodMarshalland the Persistenceof Racism in America 29-33 (Crown

1998); Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork CharlesHamilton Houston and the Struggkfor Civil Rights 84-85, 216-18
(Pennsylvania 1983). See also Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall'sLegay,, 44 Stan L Rev 1249, 1249
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representing political and cultural dissidents and new radical movements; furthering substantive but neglected interests common to all classes and races, such
as environmental quality and consumer protection"; 341 and promoting civil
rights and civil liberties. Although a right-wing public interest bar would later
emerge, the "new public interest lawyers" sought to advance a left-of-center
agenda.
The creation of the public interest bar undermined the governing class perspective in two significant ways. First, the use of the term "public interest" to
describe the work of public interest lawyers indicated that these lawyers, and not
big business lawyers, were responsible for the public good. This view became
dominant in the legal community. For example, when commentators described
the public interest work of big firms, they only mentioned the pro bono work
that was either in direct support of public interest lawyers or the same kind of
work as that done by public interest lawyers, not representation of business clients. 342 Similarly, when commentators gauged entering law students' commitment to the public good, they referred to the number of students who planned
to pursue careers in public interest law. 343 When many students instead chose
big firm practice, commentators described this as a failure of commitment to the
public good.344
Second, as the idea of the "public interest" came to be associated with fulltime public interest lawyers, their causes redefined the public good for the legal
elite. Prior to the 1960s, most elite lawyers' conceptions of the public good were
generally similar to those of their business clients. With some notable exceptions, elite lawyers were relatively conservative. While Brandeis advocated more
progressive policies than those of big business, 345 the position of the legal elite
was probably better reflected by the organized bar's joining with business to
battle Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.346 Nonetheless, even Brandeis's more
progressive views were sufficiently close to those of his business clients that he
(1992).
341. Hobbs, 32 How LJ at 505 (cited in note 317).
342. See generally Davis, 9 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol & L 119 (cited in note 317) (describing how big
firm lawyers support the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund). See also John E. Robson, Private
Layers andPublicInterest, 56 ABAJ 332, 334 (1970) (observing that "[i]nvolvement in legal problems of the
poor and in environmental issues is replacing participation in a bar association's corporate law section, and
aspiration to lead the local legal aid program ranks with ambition to head the local bar association"); Today's
News: Update, NY L J at 1 Oune 15, 1999) (reporting honorary award for large law firm that accepted numerous referrals from a legal services program over a twenty year period).
343. See Robert Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at Harvard and Beyond 7-8, 36-50
(Routiedge 1992); Robert M. Stover, Making It and Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest Commitment During
Law School 3 (Illinois 1989).
344. See note 349 and accompanying text.
345. See note 204 and accompanying text.
346. Auerbach, UnequalJustice at 192-95 (cited in note 8); Solomon, Five Crises or One at 160-62 (cited
in note 206). See also John Austin Matzko, The Eary Years of the American BarAssociation 1878-1928 148-225
(UMI Dissertation Information Service 1987) (1984 dissertation, University of Virginia) (describing the
diverse and conservative views of American Bar Association leaders during the period from 1878 to 1914).

2001]

Lawers asAmerica's Governing Class 419

could advise them on the public implications of their conduct.347 According to
Smigel's account, the counseling of elite lawyers represented an enlightened
conservatism aimed not at radical reform but at stability.348
Following the 1960s, the predominantly left-of-center public interest bar defined the public good to reflect its values. For the most part, the elite embraced
this understanding.349 But this development placed big business lawyers in a
quandary when counseling their predominantly right-of-center big business clients. Encouraging clients to seek a public good at great variance with the client's
own conceptions of their interests or the good would only alienate the client.
Elite lawyers apparently resolved this dilemma by abandoning their commitment
to the governing class role in favor of the hired gun perspective. Not surprisingly, Robert Nelson's survey of elite lawyers in the mid-1980s found both that
they were "more liberal than the corporate elites whom they represent[ed]" 350
and that they sought to promote only the client's interests, even on issues of law
reform. 351 As a result, Nelson concluded that lawyers were no longer aspiring to
serve the governing class function Smigel described "as a buffer between the
'illegitimate' desires of clients and the social interest." 352
4. The Rise of the Pro Bono Duty
Another factor facilitating the demise of the traditional governing class conception was ironically a product of that notion. The governing class ideal had
long included the belief that providing free legal services to those who could not
afford them was one component of the lawyer's duty to promote the public
good.353 During the 1970s, lawyers began to focus on supplying free legal services as a separate ethical duty and to refer to this obligation as the lawyer's pro
bono duty.354 The 1970 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility included an
347. See notes 192-95 and accompanying text. While Progressives wanted to reform government and
large corporations, they did not harbor a class antagonism toward business. Hofstadter, Te Age of Reform at
5 (cited in note 136). Indeed, the Progressive Movement had the support of many wealthy businessmen. Id
at 144-46.
348. See notes 244-252 and accompanying text.
349. See Granfield, Making Elite Leayers at 206-07 (cited in note 343); Stover, Making It andBreaking
Itat 3-4, 120 (cited in note 343).
350. Nelson, 37 Stan L Rev at 527 (cited in note 4).
351. Id at 526-27.
352. Id at 525.
353. See, for example, Hoffman, 2 Course of Legal Study at 758 (cited in note 59) (asserting in Resolution XVIII that "I shall never close my ear or heart, because my client's means are low. Those who have
none, and who have just causes, are, of all others, the best entitled to sue, or be defended; and they shall
receive a due portion of my services, cheerfilly given"); Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics at 151
(cited in note 7) (stating that "[i]t is to be hoped, that the time will never come, at this or any other Bar in
this country, when a poor man with an honest cause, though without a fee, cannot obtain the services of
honorable counsel, in the prosecution or defence of his rights').
354. See, for example, Bryan A. Garner, pr bonopublico, inA Ditionayof Modern Legal Usage 695 (Oxford 2d ed 1995) (finding that common use of the terms "pro bono" or "pro bono publico" began in the
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aspirational ethical consideration that called on lawyers to "find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." 355 The 1983 ABA Model Rules used for the
first time the term "pro bono" to describe this obligation. 35 6 Increasing the
number of lawyers' pro bono hours became a major goal of efforts to revive
professionalism. 3 7 Bar associations established pro bono campaigns and debated whether to make pro bono service mandatory. 35 8 As part of these efforts,
the ABA in 1993 voted to establish a benchmark of "at least (50) hours of pro
35 9
bono publico legal services per year."
The pro bono duty thus provided elite lawyers with an opportunity to consider themselves in compliance with their public obligations while at the same
time abandoning the governing class role. By defining a narrow sphere of public
interest practice separate from the lawyer's remunerative representation of big
business, pro bono permitted lawyers to compartmentalize their public service
obligations and avoid the governing class tension of mediating between client
interests and the public good. While representing paying clients, elite lawyers
could be hired guns. They would fulfill their public interest obligation through
pro bono work, often involving assistance to full-time public interest lawyers.
While discarding the governing class view that all legal work was public service,
pro bono now offered a new, albeit thin, conception of the lawyer's public service role, which at least arguably preserved the Business-Profession dichotomy
and the ideology of professionalism.
The pro bono idea, together with the three other factors described in this
section, offer powerful explanations for the demise of the governing class role.
Lawyers, like others in society, have come to doubt that they or anyone else can
rise above self-interest. They understand their responsibilities in terms of individual and not communal obligation. The hired gun conception of the lawyer's
role is far more compatible with these perspectives than the governing class
ideal of disinterested commitment to the common good. Trends within the legal
profession support this shift. The redefinition of the public good as inconsistent
with representation of business interests, the compartmentalization of public
service obligations into the work of the public interest bar, and the development
of the pro bono duty encouraged elite lawyers to exclude consideration of the
public good from their representation of clients.

1970s).
355. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 2, EC 2-25 (Foundation 1994).
356. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 (Foundation 1994) (the tide of Rule 6.1 is
"Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service").
357. ABA Commission on Professionalism, In the Spiritof PublicService at 47 (cited in note 295).
358. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al, The Law andEthics of Lanyering1100-01 (Foundation 3d ed 1999).
359. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 (Foundation 1994).
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CONCLUSION

Born in the American democratic experiment, the traditional conception of
lawyers as America's governing class remained dominant among the legal elite
until the late twentieth century. The belief persisted that lawyers were above
self-interest. They were able to identify and pursue the public good when serving in government positions, as civic leaders, and as representatives of clients.
Until the late twentieth century, elite lawyers balanced the governing class role
with client representation and treated the governing class obligation as the
dominant ideal. In the late twentieth century, however, the balance shifted to the
hired gun conception. The bar's efforts to attribute this move to changes in the
market for legal services, changes in bar rules, increased diversity of the profession, and deficiencies in legal education are unpersuasive. Instead, this article
suggests that lawyers shared in societal trends toward distrust of disinterested
elites and away from communal obligation. Combined with changes in the legal
profession, which redefined and compartmentalized the common good, these
influences helped convert lawyers to see themselves as only hired guns.
A number of unanswered questions remain. Will the legal elite again establish a consensus adopting a governing class role? Perhaps the legal elite will embrace a thin conception of the governing class based either on the service to the
adversary system as hired guns or on service to the community in their pro bono
activities. The elite might also restore a thick governing class conception by
abandoning the Business-Profession dichotomy. Lawyers could locate their obligation to the common good in a responsibility all occupations share in maintaining it. Lawyers may therefore find their particular governing class role in the
application of this general obligation to their participation in administering justice and maintaining societal stability. Another option might be the revival of the
original governing class conception. Absent any current indications of this possibility, this last option appears the least likely.
Further open questions relate to the societal impact of lawyers abandoning
the original governing class role. The creators of this conception considered it
necessary for the protection of the rule of law and the common good. This article has not examined the validity of this perspective, much less whether lawyers
ever actually served as America's governing class or whether we need them to
do so today. However, these inquiries are quite relevant to a reconsideration of
the role of the legal elite, or of lawyers in general, in a democratic society.360

360. I have made a preliminary effort to address this inquiry in my 1997 Baker & MacKenzie Lecture
at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law on "Democracy and Professionalism."

